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Zulauf, Jonette R., M.A., 1985 Clinical Psychology
Eyewitness Confidence and the Impact of Expert Testimony By A 
Psychologist Versus An Opposing Psychologist (149 pp.)
Director: Herman A, Walters, Ph
The use of expert psychological testimony on the unreliability 
of eyewitness testimony has become increasingly common in recent 
years. However, no previous studies have examined the impact of 
an opposing psychologist giving expert testimony on the relia^ 
bility of eyewitness testimony, a phenomenon occurring more 
frequently in the courtroom today.
120 subjects were randomly assigned to one of six experimental 
conditions. Half of the subjects viewed a videotape of a highly 
confident eyewitness, while half viewed an eyewitness of low 
confidence. Subjects then viewed a videotape of a psychologist 
giving expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony, or viewed the above psychologist plus an opposing 
psychologist giving testimony on the reliability of eyewitness 
testimony, or no further videotapes (control group). Subjects 
then completed Likert-scale questions concerning the guilt or 
innocence of the defendant, reasons for and confidence in their 
guilt versus innocence decision.
Subjects who viewed the expert psychologist alone more fre­
quently believed that the eyewitness had identified an innocent 
person rather than the gunman in a crime; they reported reduced 
guilt ratings, more decision confidence, and lower estimated 
percentages of accurate eyewitness testimony. When subjects 
subsequently viewed the opposing psychologist, they believed 
equivocally that the eyewitness had identified the gunman or 
an innocent person, similar to Controls. Expert testimony did 
not differentially effect subjects exposed to high or low con­
fidence eyewitnesses. However, expert testimony alone did 
reduce subjects' reported reliance on eyewitness confidence as 
a basis for their decision; these effects were mitigated by 
arguments presented by the opposing psychologist. Subjects who 
heard only expert testimony based their decision on it more 
than subjects who heard both expert and opposing expert testi­
mony. This study was the third in a series on expert/eyewitness 
testimony and replicated the findings of the first, but not the 
previous, study.
In summary, results support the use of expert testimony in 
cases where eyewitness testimony is important and suggest that 
an opposing psychologist will mitigate the effects of an expert 
giving testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness testimony. 
Implications for further research were discussed.
i i
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Introduction
As Justice Felix Frankfurter once noted, the 
identification of strangers is proverbially untrust­
worthy. The hazards of such testimony are established 
by a formidable number of instances in the records of 
English and American trials" (Woocher, 1977). Even 
the Supreme Court has emphasized the dangers inherent 
in eyewitness identification evidence, stating: "The
vagaries of eyewitness identification are well-known; 
the annals of criminal law are rife with mistaken 
identification" {Woocher, 1977).
Yet jurors tend to "overbelieve" eyewitnesses. A 
juror's opinion regarding whether or not an eyewitness 
properly identified an innocent person can critically 
decide the juror's vote (Wells and Lindsay, 1983) . The 
average juror views evidence of identification by an 
eyewitness as absolute proof; for the layperson, visual 
identification of the defendant by the victim or witness 
often provides the most persuasive evidence which cannot 
be overcome by contrary evidence supporting the accused 
(Wall, 1965). Wells, Lindsay and Ferguson (1979) found 
that eyewitnesses were believed almost 80% of the time. 
In one condition of a study conducted by Loftus (1974), 
jurors were told that an eyewitness to a robbery had 
less than 20/400 vision, had not been wearing his
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glasses, and could not possibly have seen the robber's 
face; yet 68% of the jurors still convicted the defen­
dant .
Unless some steps are taken to ensure that the 
unreliability of eyewitness evidence is brought to 
the attention of the triers of fact, mistaken identi­
fications will continue to be a major source of 
wrongful convictions (Woocher, 1977). Yarmey (1979), 
an expert in the area of eyewitness testimony, concluded 
that misidentification is more the rule than the excep­
tion. In a study staged in a University classroom, a 
professor was "attacked” in front of 141 student ob­
servers. Afterward, the eyewitnesses were asked to 
describe the attacker. Such descriptions were grossly 
inaccurate, with a total accuracy score of only 25% 
of the total possible points. In fact, an innocent 
bystander present at the scene of the crime was chosen 
by subjects 25% of the time. Even the professor, the 
attacked victim, incorrectly identified the innocent 
bystander as the attacker (Buckhout, 1974) .
One proposed safeguard against convictions resulting 
from faulty identifications is the admission of expert 
psychological testimony on the reliability or unrelia­
bility of eyewitness identification (Woocher, 1977).
This trend, and the known inaccuracies of eyewitness 
testimony, warrant considerable attention from experts
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in the judicial system and from researchers examining
relevant issues in forensic psychology.
This paper will focus on the following objectives:
a. the review of psychological factors relevant to 
the accuracy and reliability of eyewitness 
testimony ;
b. in relationship to the above-mentioned factors, 
discuss memory processes as they relate to 
eyewitness performance ;
c . discuss the accuracy-confidence relationship 
in eyewitness testimony, and the tendency for 
jurors to rely on eyewitness confidence to assess 
witness accuracy;
d. review expert testimony and opposing expert 
testimony research and its potential for reversing 
some of the justice-impairing effects; and
e. present a study which compared the effects of 
different types of expert testimony (opposing 
versus supporting) following an eyewitness of 
high or low confidence.
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Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony
Despite the alarmingly and unacceptably high number
of false identifications and misses given by eyewitnesses,
the criminal justice system continues to depend heavily
on such testimony. Eyewitness testimony is considered
as directy rather than circumstantial, evidence. Recently,
however, in a variety of books and reviews, psychologists
have begun to question the esteem given to eyewitness
testimony by the criminal justice system (Brown^ Deffen-
bacher, and Sturgill, 1977; Buckhout, 1974, 1976; Buckhout,
Alper, Chern, Silverberg, and Somovits, 1974; Egan,
Pittner and Goldstein, 1977 ; Katz and Reid, 1977 ; Leippe,
Wells, and O strom, 1978; Lloyd-Bostock and Clifford, 1983;
Loftus, 1979; Woocher, 19 77 ; Yarmey, 1979). Through
research, psychologists have delineated over a score of
factors which affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.
Such experiments yield almost uniform results: Most
observers make significant errors on almost every
facet of the description, from the duration of the event,
the physical description of the attacker and the clothing
worn, to the words spoken, the weapon used, and even the
sequence of events (Woocher, 1977). Yet:
...most juries, and even some judges, are unaware 
of the sources of error in eyewitness testimony 
and consequently place undue faith in its veracity... 
For the layperson, visual identification of the 
defendant by the victim or the witness often 
provides the most persuasive evidence, which 
cannot be overcome by contrary evidence supporting 
the accused (Woocher, 1977).
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Knowledge of such factors would certainly facilitate 
the jurors* decision-making process, for they are the 
people required to make a judgment about the reliabil­
ity of eyewitness testimony in a given factual situation 
In a recent survey, Loftus (1979) found that citizens 
were correct only half the time in regard to some im­
portant assumptions about eyewitness behavior. While 
entire reviews of these factors have been written else­
where and are beyond the scope of this paper, those 
factors applicable to the proposed study will be re­
viewed briefly herein.
Research has demonstrated that people often exper­
ience difficulty in estimating the duration of an 
event (Doehring, 1961; Block, 1974). Eyewitnesses are 
often asked to estimate time in a courtroom trial, and 
have a marked tendency to overestimate the duration of 
an incident. In studies using staged crimes of assault 
and theft on university campuses (Buckhout, 19 74; 
Buckhout, Alper, Chern, Silverberg, and Somovits, 1975), 
subjects estimated the duration of an event to be two- 
and-a-half times as long as it had actually lasted. 
Another study which confirmed this tendency to over­
estimate time was done by Marshall (1966), who had 
subjects view a 4 2 second film. Two weeks later, 
subjects were asked to estimate the length of the film
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and, on the average, estimated the length as 90 seconds. 
An additional study which supports the tendency for 
witnesses to overestimate time was done by Johnson and 
Scott (1976, cited in Loftus, 1979). Subjects in this 
study viewed a target for only four seconds; males 
overestimated that the target was presented for seven 
seconds, while females overestimated that the target 
was viewed for 25 seconds.
Researchers (Filer and Meals, 1959; Langer, Wapner, 
and Werner, 1961) found that time is perceived to pass 
more slowly when the observer is caught in an anxiety- 
producing situation. The desire to escape makes it 
seem as if the unpleasant event is lasting longer than 
it actually is (Buckhout, 1975). Woccher (1977) found 
that persons tend to judge time by the amount of 
activity occurring. A sudden, action-packed event 
like a crime often elicits an overestimation of the 
time passed because of the flurry of activity which 
has occurred. If the witness is in an anxiety- 
provoking or stress-producing situation, there is a 
tendency to further overestimate the amount of elapsed 
time (Sarason and Stoops, 1978). In addition, a complex 
situation may increase the tendency to overestimate time. 
Schiffman and Bobko (1974) found that as the level of
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stimulus complexity increased, subjects’ estimates of 
the interval involved also increased. In conclusion,
"there is solid evidence that errors occur in people's 
estimates of the duration of an incident, and the 
errors are in the direction of overestimation" (Loftus,
1979).
Crimes rarely occur in conditions ideal for obser­
vation. Such common circumstantial factors such as 
darkness, fast movement, and distance from the criminal 
have been shown to decrease reliability of eyewitness 
identification (Levine and Tapp, 1973). If lighting 
is poor or rapidly changing, and distracting noise or 
other activity is present, visual efficiency may drop 
drastically (Buckhout, 1975; Lezak, 1973),
Crimes often occur suddenly and unexpectedly, 
catching the witness offguard and unprepared to focus 
his or her perceptual attention on the important 
features of the event (Levine and Tapp, 1973). The 
period of observation of a criminal is often brief, 
and eyewitnesses are frequently asked to make an iden­
tification of a criminal after such an extremely short 
viewing time; the already short viewing time will often 
be even less than that reported by the eyewitness, 
given the tendency for eyewitnesses to overestimate
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the duration of a crime. Research has shown that the 
shorter the observation time, the less reliable the 
identification of the criminal and the poorer the 
recall. As viewing time is decreased, the subjects' 
memory for an image becomes more unreliable (Fox,
Note 1). Additionally, researchers have shown that 
picture recognition increases with exposure time 
(Loftus, 1972; Hintzman, 1976; Laughery, et al.,
1971) .
While it is commonly believed, especially within 
the judicial system, that stress will increase the 
ability of a victim or witness to recall a subjects' 
identity, it has been known since 1908 that this is 
not the case. The Yerkes-Dodson Law (in Braun and 
Linder, 1979) states that "for a given task, there 
is an optimal amount of arousal; a greater or lesser 
degree of activation will result in less efficient 
behavior". While some studies have shown that a mild 
level of anxiety may increase the attentiveness of the 
observer and, therefore, result in more accurate 
perception (Munsterberg, 1908), psychological research 
overwhelmingly demonstrates that perceptual abilities 
are significantly decreased and distorted when an 
observer is stressed. During a crime, where a witness
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perceives that there is a high degree of danger imminent, 
the level of stress may be considerably greater than the 
optimal level. In fact, research has shown that per­
ceptual and memory processes are actually disrupted by 
high levels of anxiety and stress (Harden, 1930; Postman 
and Bruner, 1948; Stone, 1925). Anxious eyewitnesses 
tend to be more inaccurate when giving testimony than 
non-anxious eyewitnesses (Muellar, Carlomusto, and 
Goldstein, 1978; Siegal and Loftus, 1978; Zanni and 
Offerman, 1978).
Under highly stressful conditions, people tend to 
constrict attention, concentrating on fewer and fewer 
details in their environment and attending less and 
less to extraneous details (Easterbrook, 1959). People 
may experience increased heart rate, rapid breathing, 
excessive perspiration and, most importantly, fixation 
of the eyes, which usually goes unnoticed (Noton and 
Stark, 1971). Even experienced Air Force pilots tended 
to become poor observers under stressful conditions, 
narrowing attention to the airplane joystick, for 
example (Buckhout, 1974). Researchers (Levine and Tapp, 
1973; Woocher, 1977) have found that under stress, an 
eyewitness may "close" his or her mind, focusing instead 
on a "psychologically important" detail as a "perceptual 
defense".
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More specifically, "weapon focus" is a phrase 
provided by Loftus {1979) to describe the tendency 
for an eyewitness to focus his/her attention on the 
criminal's weapon. This results in "a reduced ability 
to recall details about the assailant, and to recog­
nize the assailant at a later time". As Kahneman (1973) 
has noted, increasing the amount of time spent focusing 
on one stimulus will reduce the amount of time avail­
able to perceive competing stimuli due to a limited 
amount of processing capacity.
In a recent study. Wells and Leippe (1981) found 
that eyewitnesses were more accurate in identifying a 
criminal if they paid less attention to peripheral 
details in the room, as measured by performance on a 
test. Jurors, however, were more likely to believe an 
inaccurate witness who recalled peripheral details.
Johnson and Scott (1976, cited in Loftus, 1977), 
compared the ability of eyewitnesses to identify a 
target individual in a violent "weapon" condition versus 
a non-violent "no weapon" condition. In this study, 
observers were highly stress and either witnessed a 
confederate run into the room after hearing a violent 
interaction carrying a bloodied letter opener ("weapon" 
condition); or, after hearing a calm conversation, wit­
nessed a man enter the room holding a pen in his greased 
hands ("no weapon" condition). In the "no weapon"
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condition, 49 percent of the witnesses accurately 
identified the confederate; in the "weapon" condition, 
only one third of the subjects correctly identified 
the criminal.
Similarly, it has been shown that eyewitness testi­
mony is less accurate following an emotionally-loaded 
or violent incident than a less emotional or non-violent 
incident (Clifford and Hollin, 1981; Clifford and Scott, 
1978). Clifford and Scott (1978) found significantly 
greater ability to recall events after viewing detectives 
pressuring a reticent informant in a nonviolent manner 
than for those who viewed a more violent version of the 
same incident.
In addition, witnesses were significantly more 
accurate in their testimony after viewing a woman being 
asked for directions than after viewing a woman being 
mugged (Clifford and Hollin, 1981). Loftus (1979) has 
warned that testimony regarding an emotionally loaded 
incident should be treated more cautiously than tesimony 
in regard to a less emotional event.
Accuracy in identifying a target individual decreases 
as the number of criminals increases, as the increased 
number of criminals reduces the time available to focus 
on other details. Clifford and Hollin (1981) found that 
accuracy of eyewitness testimony decreased as the number
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of criminals was increased from one to three to five 
criminals, especially in the violent "mugging*' condi­
tion .
The uniqueness or distinctiveness of a suspect's 
facial features is another factor which influences the 
accuracy of eyewitness testimony. Recent research has 
shown that atypical or unusual faces are more readily 
recognized than nondistinct or typical faces (Courtois 
and Muellar, 1981; Light, Kayra-Stuart, and Hollander, 
1979; Going and Read, 1974). Even one distinctive 
feature may be sufficient to bias a witness toward 
identifying a suspect (Woocher, 1977). Some of the 
more common factors which may unfavorably increase a 
suspect's chance of being selected are unusual physical 
characteristics (e.g., scars or tatoos), different 
clothing, demeanor, facial expression, or anything 
which increases dissimilarity to other suspects 
(Woocher, 1977). On the other hand, more typical- 
looking males are more likely to be misidentifled, 
especially if the suspect is described as average 
(Courtois, and Muellar, 1981).
Another phenomenon common in many eyewitness 
misidentifications is "unconscious transference", a 
phrase coined by Williams (1963, cited in Loftus, 1979) 
in his description of an English murder case which may
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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have resulted in the execution of an innocent man.
One of the witnesses who identified the defendant had 
interacted with him briefly prior to the crime and 
"may have unconsciously effected a transference" 
(Williams^ 1963, in Loftus, 1979). Unconscious 
transference occurs when a person seen in an insignif­
icant situation is recalled as a person viewed in a 
significant event. Or more specifically,
the phenomenon by which an otherwise 
insignificant event, occurring immediately 
before or after a significant event may, 
upon recall, become merged with the most 
significant event. One consequence is 
that, upon recollection, one could con­
fuse the face of a person seen in an 
insignificant event with that of a person 
involved in a subsequent significant event 
(Fishman and Loftus, 1978).
An illustrative and classic case of unconscious 
transference has been provided by Wall (1965). An 
employee who sold tickets in a railroad station was 
robbed at gunpoint. Subsequently, he mistakenly 
identified a sailor from a lineup as the malefactor.
The sailor, however, had a credible alibi when ques­
tioned and was released. When the ticket agent was 
questioned, he stated that he had identified the 
sailor "because he looked familiar". Subsequent in­
vestigation revealed that the sailor had purchased 
train tickets from this agent on three different 
occasions. The ticket agent had inaccurately connected
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the familiar sailor's face with the context of the 
robbery. Knowing the face is familiar but confusing the 
context in which it was seen is a basic definition of 
unconscious transference.
Another study which exemplifies the phenomenon of 
unconscious transference was done by Buckhout (1974).
An assault was staged in front of a classroom on a 
professor. Seven weeks later, witnesses attempted to 
pick the assailant from an array of six photographs.
Over forty percent of the witnesses identified the 
criminal as the innocent bystander who had been present 
during the assault but was not the criminal. Forty 
percent of the witnesses accurately identified the 
guilty person.
Similarly, Loftus (1976) provided subjects with a 
story about six college students, with an accompanying 
photograph of each story character, including a photo­
graph of the criminal. Three days later, half of the 
subjects were required to identify the criminal from a 
set of five pictures which did not include the criminal 
but did include the face of a bystander incidental to 
the story. Results showed that 7 9 percent of the wit­
nesses selected the innocent bystander.
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The phenomenon of unconscious transference brings 
into question the common practice of asking a witness 
to identify a criminal from a group of photographs. 
Research demonstrates that a witness will often make 
a future identification by relying on familiarity 
rather than their original memory. What seems to 
be occurring is a blending of the witness's original 
perception of the event, knowledge acquired prior 
to the event, and inferences drawn after the event; 
over time, information from these sources has been 
integrated into a single memory (Loftus, 1976). Mis­
identif ication is exacerbated further if the original 
choice of the eyewitness is incorrect (Brown, Deffen­
tacher, and Sturgill, 19 77; Gorenstein and Ellsworth,
1980).
There are numerous factors which may affect the 
accuracy of eyewitness identification when witnesses 
are attempting to select a criminal from a lineup.
For example, Katz and Reid (1977) found that when 
a witness had already pro\7lded police with a description 
of the criminal and was later asked to identify the 
suspect in a lineup, the witness sought a suspect 
who fit his/her given description. Therefore, an 
unbiased lineup must be composed of potential suspects
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who each fit the witness's initial description of 
the criminal. Buckhout (1976) has delineated three 
factors to ensure an impartial lineup, arranging it 
so that:
a. all items have an equal chance of being 
selected by a person who did not see 
the suspect;
b. the items are similar enough to each 
other and to the original description 
of the suspect to be confusing to a 
person who is merely guessing; and
c. the test is conducted without leading 
questions or suggestions from the 
test giver (p. 84).
A number of studies are illustrative of the poten­
tial influence on witnesses of subtle suggestions 
given by an interrogator. Indeed, research has shown 
that test or lineup administrators may "verbally, 
nonverbally, or unconsciously" cue subjects in ways 
which influence identification of the criminal 
(Rosenthal, 1966). For example, telling a witness 
that the suspect "is in the lineup" resulted in an 
increased number of misidentifications versus telling 
witnesses that the suspect " may or may not be" in 
the lineup (Hall and Ostrom, cited in Wells, 1978).
If the identification procedure is conducted by an 
authority figure, such as the police, subjects are 
particularly likely to be influenced by suggestive 
procedures (Milgram, 1963). Subjects more frequently 
attempt identifications in the presence of authority
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 17
figures, even if they are inaccurate. If witnesses 
are shown a series of photographs, some of which are 
mugshots and some of which are not, witnesses will 
more frequently choose one of the mugshots as the 
suspect. In addition, Buckhout (1974) provrded witnesses 
one of two layouts of photographs; a biased spread, 
where the suspect's head is tilted, he is grinning, 
and the photograph itself is placed at an angle; and 
an unbiased spread, where the attacker's photograph 
is aligned with the others and shows a similar full- 
face view. Under varying conditions, the same suspect 
was chosen significantly more frequently under the 
biased condition. Further, if a person feels pressured 
by social desirability or majority opinions, s/he 
may go along with a decision even if it is wrong (Asch, 
1955),
Recently, experts have been focusing on the "foils" 
used in a lineup, the persons in the lineup who are 
not suspects. The "functional size" of the lineup 
is more important than the actual number of persons 
employed in the lineup (Lindsay and Wells, 1980; Wells, 
Leippe, and Ostrom, 1979). Functional size is deter­
mined through the use of mock witnesses who view a 
lineup after being given a simple description of the 
suspect. The functional size is then derived by a 
formula: the total number of mock witnesses asked
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to make an identification divided by the number of 
eyewitnesses who choose the suspect (Fox, Note 1). 
Functional size decreases as foils are increasingly 
dissimilar from the suspect. Conversely, the function­
al size of the lineup increases as foils more closely 
resemble the suspect. For example, if the suspect 
is described as a "short, heavy-set, older man", a 
lineup consisting of a tall, slim, redhaired woman, 
a young teenager, an elderly lady, and a five year 
old child would yield a functional size of 1.0. Con­
versely, if all the foils in the lineup were short, 
heavy-set, older men, the functional size would approx­
imately equal the number of foils. As the functional 
size increases, so does the likelihood that a fair 
lineup was conducted (Fox, Note 1).
One identification procedure which is likely to 
be extremely biased is the "showup", with a functional 
size of 1.0. In the showup, a police officer (most 
frequently) presents only the suspect to the eyewitness 
for identification, and s/he is expected to respond 
"yes" or "no" as to whether that person is the criminal. 
Katz and Reid (1977) stated that during a showup, 
the witness assumes that the subject is the prime 
suspect. Researchers agree that under such circumstances, 
a witness is apt to cast aside his or her doubts about 
the suspect’s identity, preferring to trust the judgment
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of the police officer who identified him or her and 
who the witness may subconsciously wish to please 
or fear disagreeing with (Buckhout, 1976; Katz and 
Reid, 1977).
"Retroactive inhibition" as a phenomenon affecting 
eyewitness testimony has been well-documented in the 
psychological literature. Essentially, as the time 
elapsed between an observation of an incident and 
its recall increases, memory for the event decreases. 
Buckhout (19 74) found that observers reproduced an 
original drawing with decreasing accuracy at immediate, 
one month and three month intervals- More specifically, 
Egan, Pittner, and Goldstein (1977) found that mistaken 
identifications by eyewitnesses increased in number 
(from 48 percent to 62 percent to 93 percent) as the 
crime-identification interval increased from two days 
to 21 days to 56 days. Similarly, Courtois and Muellar 
(1981) showed significant decreases in correct identifi­
cations by subjects as the interval increased (from 
one minute to two days to 28 days) between viewing 
photographs and re—viewing photograph arrays with 
distractors. Shepard (1967) demonstrated a decrease 
from 100 percent correct picture recognition after 
a two-hour delay to 57 percent correct picture recog­
nition after four months (guessing would have yielded
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50 percent correct).
While many of the most pertinent psychological 
factors which affect eyewitness testimony have been 
reviewed here, it should be noted that there are numerous 
additional well-documented factors. Such factors 
as the attractiveness of the suspect, needs and motives 
of the witness, cross—racial identifications, the 
effects of alcohol, the physical condition of the 
eyewitness, personal biases, perceived significance 
of the witnessed event, expectancies of the eyewitness, 
etc., also influence the accuracy of eyewitness testi­
mony. One might wonder how jurors' decisions would 
be affected if they were made aware of these factors 
which cast considerable doubt on the reliability of 
eyewitness testimony.
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Memory
A complete, comprehensive review of the literature
and research on memory has been presented recently by
Wickelgren (1981) and, therefore, will not be included
herein. Rather, a description of the hypothetical 
stages of memory, distortions and inaccuracies of 
memory, and a brief discussion of several theoretical 
models of memory follow.
Often the issue of identification accuracy is 
sufficient to decide a case in that if a witness's 
memory is correct, then the defendant is undoubtedly 
guilty. Yet memory is imperfect and quite malleable 
(Loftus, 1980). Distortions of memory may occur at 
any basic hypothetical "stage" of memory or within 
one of the proposed basic "types" of memory. Yarmey
(1979) has divided the memory process into three 
theoretical stages: (1) sensory memory, (2) short­
term memory, and (3) long-term memory. Sensory memory 
includes the initial rapid, superficial information 
processing that occurs within a fraction of a second.
A select part of this information is further processed 
at the next stage of memory, short-term, while the 
remainder becomes quickly lost through the process of 
decay or is replaced by attention to novel stimuli.
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If information in short-term memory is rehearsed within 
the first thirty seconds, it is transferred to long-term 
memory. Unrehearsed information is lost, and some 
additional loss may occur during the transfer to long­
term storage. Once information is stored in long-term 
memory, it is vulnerable to loss over time or to dis­
tortion by subsequently occurring events. The theoretical 
dimensions of long-term memory include an infinite 
capacity for storage and lifetime duration.
Most authors (e.g., Loftus, 1979; Yarmey, 1979; 
Wickelgren, 1981) divide the memory process into three 
separate stages: (1) acquisition (or encoding), (2)
retention, and (3) retrieval. During acquisition, 
physical stimuli are encoded into memory. Next, during 
the retention stage, the coded information is system­
atized and stored. Finally, during the retrieval process, 
the material is recalled from storage and transferred to 
short-term memory for utilization.
A commonly held belief among both professionals and 
laypersons is the view that memory functions like a 
videotape recorder, permanently recording and storing 
events as they occur. Historically, this model has been 
supported by work done by Penfield during the 1940's 
using electrical stimulation while operating on the 
brains of epileptics to produce recall of forgotten 
events. Both Penfield*s research and the videotape
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récorder model of memory have been refuted. Penfield's 
reports demonstrated spontaneous memory recall in only 
3.5% of his patients, and there is reason to believe 
that even these cases involved reconstructions or in­
ferences and not actual memories (Loftus and Loftus,
198 0). In regard to the videotape recorder model of 
memory, Wickelgren (1981) stated that "we can confidently 
assert that this nonassociative theory [videotape 
recorder model] of LTM is false." Despite such contrary 
evidence, Loftus and Loftus (1980) recently found that 
84 percent of psychologists surveyed and 69 percent of 
laymen surveyed agreed that "everything we learn is 
permanently stored in the mind."
For over a decade, the videotape recorder model of 
memory has been supported through the use of hypnosis 
to retrieve details of permanently stored memories 
(Cheek and LeCron, 1968). However, recent research 
contradicts this model on several bases. Hypnosis is 
an interpersonal relationship between the therapist 
and the subject which demands that the subject behave 
in a way that is pleasing to the hypnotist (Hilgard,
1979; Watkins, 1982); therefore, the subject may be 
more willing, rather than more able, to report the 
recollection of past events. Highly suggestible 
subjects often provide responses desired by the hypnotist
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even when prior instructions were to the contrary 
(Watkins, 1982), This "transference" between the 
hypnotist and subject can have a determining effect 
on the responses elicited (Watkins, 1982). Experiments 
have shown that subjects under hypnosis will confidently 
recall events not only from the past, but from the 
future as well (Kline, 19 58; Rubenstein and Newman,
1954); and that hypnosis may irreversibly alter one's 
memory (Hilgard and Loftus, 1979; Loftus, 1979). Putnam 
(19 79) recently completed research which suggests that 
hypnotized subjects are more vulnerable to distortion 
of memories generated by leading questions than are 
nonhypnotized subjects.
Misleading questions and other events occurring 
subsequent to the target event may actually produce a 
change in the stored memory. Loftus (1975) demonstrated 
that if a subject is asked a question which presupposes 
the existence of a nonexistent object, that object may 
become merged with the actual memory of the event. In 
this study, subjects viewed a film showing a car traveling 
on a country road. Later, when subjects were asked a 
leading question about how fast the car was traveling 
when it passed the barn, seventeen percent claimed to 
have seen a barn; however, only three percent of the
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control subjects said they had seen a barn. Other 
misleading questions pertaining to an object actually 
present in the scene may lead to distortion of color 
or type; for example, asking about the red car when 
the color of the viewed car was actually green (Loftus, 
1977; Loftus, Miller and Burns, 1978).
Loftus and Zanni (1975) demonstrated that the 
phrasing of the interrogation can strongly influence 
stored memory. Questions asked of subjects regarding 
nonexistent objects which included the word the (Did 
you see the broken headlight?) were significantly more 
likely to elicit "recognition" responses than the same 
question phrased with the word "a" (Did you see a 
broken headlight?), Loftus and Palmer (1974) had 
subjects view a film and subsequently estimate the 
speed a car was traveling in the film. Those subjects 
who were asked how fast the cars were traveling when 
they smashed each other provided significantly higher 
speed estimates and increased reports of broken glass 
(although there was no broken glass in the film) than 
subjects who were asked how fast the cars were going 
when the hit each other.
The above-mentioned research and a series of studies 
done by Loftus and her colleagues (1975, 1977, 1978) have
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clearly demonstrated that stored memory may be distorted 
by later events, leading psychologists to support the 
"reconstructive" model of memory, which explains the 
propensity for originally stored information to differ 
from recalled information. In an experiment involving 
a stop sign where the subject is subsequently asked a 
misleading question implying that they had viewed a 
"yield" sign, subjects reported seeing what they were 
told they saw (the yield sign) rather than what they 
actually saw (the stop sign). Even when confronted with 
two slides simultaneously (on halves of the same screen), 
one being the actual slide containing the stop sign and 
the other containing the yield sign (what the subject 
was told s/he saw), subjects reported that they had 
seen the yield sign.
The "supplementation of nothing" hypothesis states 
that the subject may simply fail to store information 
about the critical object (e.g., the stop sign) at the 
time of the original viewing, and the postperceptual 
distortion results from adding the misleading informa­
tion to memory, providing the basis for the subsequent 
report. This theory has been rejected by research which 
has demonstrated that immediately after a viewing, over 
90% of subjects tested correctly identified the sign 
they had seen. A second coexistence or permanence
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 27
hypothesis suggests that the information acquired post- 
perceptually is added to the memory and coexists with 
the original information. This theory has been difficult 
to refute but attempts to recover the original informa­
tion once it has been tampered with have failed. Loftus 
and Loftus* (1980) research tested this hypothesis exper­
imentally and they concluded that "... the pattern of 
responses ... suggests that the subjects had completely 
lost the original information...". These and results of 
other studies suggest that substitution has occurred, 
where the misleading information has irrevocably replaced 
the original memory. Loftus and Loftus (198 0) have 
convincingly demonstrated that there is evidence to 
support the "substitution" hypothesis. It is therefore 
reasonable to believe that memory is not necessarily 
permanent.
However, two very recent studies suggest that the 
coexistence hypothesis should not be so readily dis­
missed, Anton (Note 3) completed a partial replication 
of one of Loftus* second guess experiments using mis­
leading information which had provided support for the 
substitution hypothesis of memory. He found that sub­
jects* second guesses revealed that the original information 
about the critical item had been retained in memory, a 
finding that is inconsistent with the substitution 
hypothesis. Using the same stop sign/yield sign sequence.
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Bekerian and Bowers (1983) also found strong support 
for the coexistence hypothesis using similar methodology. 
Bekerian and Bowers attribute their results to having 
increased the number of cues in the retrieval environ­
ment and point out that in Loftus* second-guess exper­
iments, no additional cues relevant to the original 
encoding were given to subjects between their first 
and second responses.
Wells and Lindsay (1983) have provided a "metamemory 
theory", a complex analysis explaining the types of infor­
mation used by people to infer the accuracy of another 
person's memory. For their purposes, metamemory is 
defined as the individual's knowledge of and awareness 
of memory or of anything pertinent to information storage 
and retrieval. It is postulated that three types of 
information are used to judge the accuracy of another 
person's memory.
The first is conditional information, which includes 
information from "self-based judgments" (would I have 
remembered under those conditions?) and sample-based 
information or expert opinions. While the latter type 
of information may not be optimally utilized, Loftus 
(1980) has shown that people do use it at least at some 
1eve1.
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The second type of information used is intra- and 
inter-subjective agreement information. Intrasubjective 
disagreement is defined as the lack of consistency in 
one's report of his/her memory of an event. Lack of 
intrasubjective agreement has a significant discrediting 
effect which goes beyond the inconsistent item(s) to 
produce a more general discrediting effect of the person 
and his/her memory for the entire event. Wells and 
Leippe (1981) showed that if an eyewitness changes even 
a trivial detail of his or her report, that person would 
subsequently be judged less likely to have accurately 
identified the accused from a lineup. Intersubjective 
agreement, referring to the consistency of memorial 
accounts between two or more witnesses, is a rational 
process of inference used by a memory judge. However, 
it can be distorted by conditional information which 
favors one witness over another. Also, two or more 
witnesses may be subject to the same error; for example, 
overestimating and agreeing upon the duration of an 
event. Wells and Leippe (1981) explored a subset of 
intersubjective disagreement and found that witnesses 
who erred in regard to peripheral detail of a scene or 
event were discredited by the memory judge, even though 
they were ultimately less likely to make a false identi­
fication in the lineup - they were perceived as if the 
opposite were true.
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The third type of information used by a memory 
judge is response-bias information. Response bias 
refers to the tendency of a witness to report s/he 
has remembered something without regard for the strength 
of the memory trace. For example, an eyewitness making 
an identification from a lineup may have a response bias 
to choose a member of the lineup and to do so in spite 
of low certainty. Wells and Lindsay (1983) suggest 
that confidence might be construed as only a subset of 
a broader phenomenon, merely providing an avenue for 
the memory judge to discern the existence of a response 
bias.
In a similar vein, it has been shown that a person 
who has previously made a free admission of memory 
failure is accorded greater credibility on some other 
memory item (Wells and Leippe, 1981). It seems that 
this communicates to the memory judge that the person 
is not likely to fabricate a response, i.e., is not 
operating with a response bias. Further, a witness 
with high confidence in his/her memory tells the memory 
judge that his/her memory trace exceeds a certain high 
criterion. However, a witness who expresses low con­
fidence tells the memory judge that had a higher 
criterion for reporting been applied, the memory might 
not have been reported? the memory judge may then infer 
that there is a response bias to report a memory despite
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its weak trace.
More specifically, those eyewitnesses who consistently 
(i.e., on every cross-examination question) show high 
confidence in response to every probe of their memory 
are not believed, but are judged to have a bias to 
respond with confidence (e.g., are seen as "too sure" of 
themselves). A witness' confidence does not have to be 
explicitly stated; rather, it is communicated through 
both verbal and nonverbal channels. One of the most 
consistent factors judged is the application of verbal 
qualifiers in an eyewitness's report of a memory. Verbal 
qualifiers, such as "I think ..." or "I guess ..." or 
"It must have been ...", signal the memory judge that a 
process labeled "constructive invocation" is in use; 
this tells the judge that the memory reporter is utilizing 
reconstructive memory and that, therefore, the reporter 
has a response bias toward providing an answer even if it 
is not truly remembered.
Clearly, then the concept of memory as a pure, passive, 
and permanent process must be reconsidered. Instead, 
memory must be reconceptualized as an active process that 
is both fallible and sensitive to a variety of external 
influences which render it inaccurate and subject to 
distortion at times. As psychologists closely examine 
memory processes and become increasingly aware of the 
intricacies involved therein, they move further and
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further away from the prevalent view of the brain as 
a permanent and accurate videotape recorder. As a 
result, this knowledge has serious implications for 
police work and the processes used by our judicial 
sy s tern.
It has become increasingly common for attorneys 
to procure expert witnesses to educate jurors in regard 
to the strengths and weaknesses of human memory, 
depending on which side of the adversarial system one 
might stand. As experts become pitted against experts, 
jurors will have an increasingly difficult time drawing 
culpability conclusions. How jurors react and wade 
through the quagmire of facts they are bombarded with 
has important implications for the future of the use 
of eyewitness testimony, presently so heavily relied 
upon, and for the functioning of the entire legal system,
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Confidence
Recent research in the area of eyewitness testimony 
has focused on the confidence of the eyewitness. Studies 
have shown that subject-jurors are as likely to believe 
an inaccurate eyewitness as they are to believe an 
accurate one (Lindsay, Wells, and Rumpel, 1981; Wells, 
Lindsay and Ferguson, 1979; Wells, Lindsay and Tousignant, 
1980; Wells, Ferguson and Lindsay, 1981), Jurors con­
sistently tended to overbelieve eyewitnesses in such 
studies, their belief being highly correlated with the 
confidence of the witness (Lindsay, et al., 1981; Wells, 
et al., 1979, Wells, et al., 1980). Specifically, 
research suggests that as much as fifty percent of 
the variance in the jurors* choice to believe an eye­
witness can be accounted for by the confidence of the 
eyewitness (Wells, et al., 1979). For example, Hastie 
(cited in Wells, et al., 1980) subjected jury deliber­
ation videotapes to an analysis of eyewitness identi­
fication remarks and found that most jurors assumed 
that high confidence by the eyewitness implied accuracy.
The judicial system itself relies upon eyewitness 
confidence to evaluate witness credibility. In Neil 
V .  Biggers (1972), a landmark United States Supreme 
Court case, the jurors assumed and the Court insisted
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that eyewitness confidence is a highly reliable cue to 
determine witness credibility. However, the relation­
ship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy has 
not been supported by research. Wells, et al., (1979) 
propose that more than ninety percent of the variance 
in eyewitness confidence can be accounted for by factors 
other than eyewitness accuracy. Although the confidence- 
accuracy relationship has at times been shown to be 
positive (Lipton, 1977; Wells, et al., 1979), it has 
more often been found to be unrelated or even negative 
(Buckhout, 1979; Loftus, Miller and Burns, 1978; Leippe, 
Wells, and Ostrom, 1978; Yarmey, 1979), In a compre­
hensive review of such studies, Deffenbacher (1980) 
concluded that about half of the studies found a positive 
but modest confidence-accuracy correlation, and half 
noted a zero or negative correlation. Deffenbacher 
(198 0) suggests that under conditions not conducive 
to forming an accurate memory (reviewed earlier), 
the relationship between confidence and accuracy is 
near zero. Further, the "significant" relationships 
between accuracy and confidence are often modest, at 
most (r = .20 to r̂ = .40).
The familiarity or novelty of a task has been shown 
to effect the confidence-accuracy relationship. Lich­
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tenstein and Fischhoff (1977) found no relationship 
between confidence and accuracy on a novel task, while 
subjects* confidence was significantly related to 
accuracy on a familiar task. It has been suggested 
that criminal identification usually involves a novel 
experience, described as a single exposure to a novel 
stimulus and subsequent subjection to a recognition 
test (Wells, et al., 1979). Therefore, they predict 
that novel encounters such as criminal identification 
will result in a poor accuracy-confidence rleationship. 
Similarly, Leippe (1980) found that as viewing condi­
tions became less optimal, the accuracy-confidence 
relationship became nonexistent; and hypothesized that 
both reconstructive memory processes and social in­
fluences markedly affect such a relationship. Therefore, 
as Deffenbacher (1980) concludes, the judicial system 
should cease its reliance upon eyewitness confidence 
as an index of eyewitness accuracy.
Perhaps more importantly, studies suggest that the 
accuracy-confidence relationship can be readily influenced 
by certain legal procedures. Specifically, it has been 
shown that witness' confidence in a false memory can 
easily be enahnced by a common legal procedure used 
by attorneys known as "briefing" (Wells, et al., 1981). 
Wells, et al. (1981) briefed half their eyewitnesses in
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a manner which closely parallels the tactic of briefing 
used by attorneys. Eyewitnesses were instructed to 
rehearse their testimony, were given sample questions in 
preparation for cross-examination, and were warned that 
cross-examiners would be probing for inconsistencies in 
their testimony. The briefed eyewitnesses rated them­
selves as more confident than the eyewitnesses who were 
not briefed; the majority of the increase in confidence 
was attributed to inaccurate eyewitnesses increasing 
their confidence. Subject-jurors judged briefed eye­
witnesses as more confident than non-briefed eyewitnesses. 
The confidence-accuracy correlation was essentially 
eliminated for briefed witnesses, but a small relation­
ship was found for non-briefed witnesses. More importantly, 
greater belief was given to the briefed eyewitness's 
testimony, which corresponded with an increase in guilty 
votes. Thus, eyewitness confidence is more than just a 
correlate of the extent to which jurors believe the 
eyewitness; increasing the witness's expressed confidence 
actually increased the juror's reliance upon their 
testimony {Wells, et al., 1981). Techniques such as 
briefing, both commonly employed and openly advocated 
in the legal system, make inaccurate witnesses more 
confident in their testimony. As a result, jurors 
overbelieve inaccurate eyewitnesses (Wells, et al., 1981).
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Wells, Lindsay and Tousignant (1980), in a repli­
cation of another study (Lindsay, Wells, and Rumpl,
1981), instructed subject-jurors to ignore the eye­
witness's confidence because it has not proven to be 
a reliable indicator of eyewitness accuracy. Subject- 
jurors who were not told to ignore witness confidence 
were unable to distinguish between accurate-identifi­
cation and false—identification witnesses, displayed 
the tendency to overbelieve eyewitnesses under poor 
witnessing conditions, and showed some adjustment in 
belief rates according to the witnessing conditions. 
Subject-jurors who were told to ignore confidence also 
showed no ability to distinguish between accurate- 
identification and false-identification eyewitnesses; 
they did no better in taking witnessing conditions 
into account. However, they did greatly reduce their 
belief in eyewitness testimony, from 61.5% (with no 
advice to ignore confidence) to 40.5% (with advice). 
Further, in marked contrast to control (no advice) group 
results, high-confidence eyewitnesses were no more likely 
to be believed than were low-confidence eyewitnesses. 
Thus, while it is possible to lessen the jurors' degree 
of reliance on eyewitness confidence, this in itself 
will not make them better judges of eyewitness accuracy 
(Wells, Lindsay, and Tousignant, 1980).
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The findings that suggest that jurors are strongly 
affected by the confidence of the eyewitness and that 
accuracy and confidence do not correspond, presenting 
serious problems and challenges for the judicial system 
as it functions today. However, recent research indicates 
that expert testimony focusing on the unreliability of 
eyewitness identification, or similar instructions 
presented to jurors by a judge, may mitigate the impact 
of eyewitness confidence and lessen jurors* tendencies 
to overbelieve eyewitnesses. Unfortunately, this is 
likely to result in attorneys pitting expert against 
expert, resulting in confusion to jurors and unknown 
consequences in regard to the fairness of verdicts.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 39
Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification
Several recent studies have examined the impact of 
expert psychological testimony on jurors' decision 
(Hosch, Beck and McIntyre, 1980; Loftus, 1980b; Wells, 
Lindsay and Tousignant, 1980; Fox (Note 1)). The 
results consistently demonstrate that subject-jurors 
are significantly influenced by hearing expert testi­
mony on eyewitness identification.
The first studies conducted in the area were done by 
Loftus (1980b). In a pair of experiments, she presented 
subject-jurors with written summaries of an assault case, 
half of which included expert testimony and half did not. 
The results of the first study showed that expert testi­
mony significantly reduced the percentage of individually- 
reached guilty verdicts from 57.5% to 39%. In the second 
study, it was found that when deliberating to reach a 
verdict, juries whose summaries included expert testimony 
spent significantly more time discussing the eyewitness* 
accounts than did those juries whose summaries did not 
include expert testimony. This result suggests that 
presenting psychological expert testimony on the unrelia­
bility of eeyewitness testimony may increase the amount 
of attention jurors pay to eyewitness accounts, perhaps 
increasing scrutinization of such testimony. In addition, 
juries whose summaries contained expert testimony con­
victed the defendant less frequently.
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Hosch, Beck and McIntyre (1980) investigated the 
effects of expert testimony first on community resident 
subjects who served as jurors in a reenacted courtroom 
trial; and secondly on college student juries who 
viewed a videotape of the same court proceedings. Both 
groups viewed a burglary case trial in which the eyewit­
ness identified the defendant as the criminal. Half of 
the subjects in each sample subsequently heard the ex­
pert testimony of a psychologist. While there were no 
significant differences between the community resident 
verdicts and those of college-student juries, subjects 
who heard the expert psychological testimony placed 
less importance on eyewitness testimony in reaching 
their decision and spent more time examining all of 
the evidence that was presented in the case.
Wells, Lindsay and Tousignant (1980) presented 
subjects with a videotape of expert psychological testi- 
mong prior to exposing them to a videotapes cross-exam­
ination of an eyewitness. The eyewitnesses had previously 
witnessed a staged theft under poor, moderate, or good 
visibility conditions and had been asked to make an 
identification; they were either accurate or inaccurate. 
The expert testimony was found to significantly reduce 
the subjects' tendency to rely heavily on eyewitness 
confidence; belief of accurate witnesses was reduced 
bv 18% and belief of inaccurate witnesses was reduced
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by 24%. Expert psychological testimony essentially 
eliminated jurors' overbelief tendencies, although 
it did lead to some "underbelief" of accurate witnesses.
While only the handful of studies cited above have 
been completed in this area, it is certain from the 
results that expert psychological testimony may signif­
icantly impact the weight and credibility the juror 
assigns to eyewitness testimony. Psychologists gen­
erally agree that their role as experts should focus 
on the provision of scientific knowledge to facilitate 
and increase the accuracy of a juror's verdict. While 
the testimony offered in some studies has included 
case-relevant factors, most psychologists believe that 
expert testimony should not offer jurors post hoc 
probabilities of an eyewitness's credibility or accuracy 
in a particular case {Loftus, 1980b; Hosch, et al., 1980; 
Wells, et al., 1980; Woocher, 1977).
However, there is some controversy surrounding the 
issues of how relevant the expert psychological testimony 
should be to the instant case. It has been suggested 
(Woocher, 1977) that expert psychological testimony 
should provide jurors the scientific knowledge necessary 
for evaluating the eyewitness evidence by tailoring 
their responses to the facts of the case at hand. In 
accordance with this advice, both the Loftus (1980b) and 
Hosch, et al., (1980) studies included "relevant ractors"
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testimony. The expert in the Hosch, et al., {1980} research 
testified on the relevant factors of duration of the event 
and stress; and offered an opinion on a hypothetical case 
which so closely paralleled the facts of the instant case 
that he bordered on offering an opinion in the case. The 
expert in the Loftus (1980b) study testified on the 
relevant factors of cross-racial identification, stress, 
weapon focus, and alcohol. In contrast. Wells, et al.,
(1980) argues that a more general form of expert testimony 
is more time and cost-efficient than relevant factors 
expert testimony. Accordingly, the expert in the Loftus 
(1980b) study focused only on the general unreliability 
of using eyewitness confidence to assess accuracy, and 
instead advised a strategy of focusing on the situational 
factors that the eyewitness reports; and testified on 
the fallibility of accurately choosing a defendant from 
a lineup.
One study (Fox, Note 1) compared the effects of 
"general" expert testimony with "relevant factors" 
testimony, and also manipulated the variable of eyewitness 
confidence. Results of his study showed that both 
"general" and "relevant factors" expert testimony 
significantly reduced guilt ratings, and also decreased
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the subject-jurors' belief that the eyewitness had 
accurately identified the gunman. While "relevant 
factors" testimony reduced guilt ratings and the belief 
that the eyewitness had correctly identified the gunman 
more than "general" expert testimony, the differences 
were not statistically significant. Although subject- 
jurors' reliance on eyewitness confidence as an indicator 
of eyewitness accuracy was significantly reduced by the 
expert testimony, it did not totally eliminate the subject- 
jurors' tendency to believe the high-confidence witness 
more than the low—confidence eyewitness.
In a very recent study, Weisser (Note 2), in a 
partial replication of Fox's (note 1) research, explored 
the effects of both general and relevant factors expert 
testimony and expert testimony given to jurors in the 
form of judge's instructions. Although he used 
equivalent methodology to the Fox (Note 1) study, 
results of his study failed to replicate the previous 
findings in that the majority of subjects in all con­
ditions believed the eyewitness had identified an 
innocent person. The use of judge's instructions to 
convey psychological research results concerning the 
unreliability of eyewitness identification was found
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to be as effective as the use of a psychologist giving 
expert (general or relevant factors) testimony.
The present study compared the effects of relevant 
factors psychological expert testimony to relevant 
factors expert testimony plus opposing psychological 
expert testimony to a control (no expert testimony) 
condition. Relevant factors expert testimony was used 
here because it has been shown to be more effective 
than general expert testimony (Fox, Note 1), and would 
be better suited for rebuttal by another expert psych­
ologist hired by opposing counsel in an actual court 
case. As was done in the Fox (Note 1), Loftus (1980b), 
Hosch, et al. (1980), and Weisser (Note 2) studies, the 
expert testimony was presented following the eyewitness 
testimony, as this is the order used most frequently 
in the actual courtroom setting.
The eyewitness videotapes and one of the psychologist 
expert testimony videotapes were the same as those used 
by Fox (Note 1) and Weisser (Note 2). These tapes have 
been rated by subject-jurors as very realistic and their 
use facilitated this second replication in a series of 
expert testimony studies. This was the first known study 
to simulate the adversarial use of psychologists providing 
expert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness iden­
tification, Hypotheses were non-directional due to the 
exploratory nature of the study.




A 3 X 2 X 2 factoral design was used in this study.
The factor of "eyewitness confidence" during testimony 
had two levels (high confidence vs. low confidence).
The "expert testimony" variable had three levels: the
no expert testimony (control) condition, relevant 
factors expert testimony only condition, and the 
relevant factors expert testimony plus opposing expert 
testimony condition. The sex of subject variable had 
two levels (male and female). Subjects were randomly 
assigned to serve in one of the six conditions, with 
twenty (20) subjects, including ten (10) males and ten 
(10) females, in each experimental condition. The 
design utilized, exclusive of the sex factor, is shown 
diagrammatically below:
Eyewitness Confidence
Low Confidence High Confidence
Control (no expert testimony) n = 20 n = 20
Relevant Factors Expert
Testimony Only n = 20 n = 20
Relevant Factors Expert
Testimony Plus Opposing
Expert Testimony n = 2 0  n = 20
45
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 45
Subjects
One—hundred twenty (sixty male and sixty female) 
introductory psychology student at the University of 
Montana volunteered to serve as subjects. Each 
received course credit for participation in the 
experiment.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 4 7
Data Analysis
Analysis of variance was performed on the dependent 
measures employing Likert-type scales. When significant 
main effects were found for the expert testimony factor 
or when significant interaction effects were found, 
Newman-Keuls tests were subsequently performed, allowing 
for pairwise comparisons among the cells. For the 
single dichotomous question, the gunman versus innocent 
person decision, the chi-square test was performed.
When significant results were found for the level of 
expert testimony factor, then Bonferroni tests, which 
allowed for comparisons among individual cells involved 
in the chi-square test, were subsequently performed.
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Procedure
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the six 
experimental conditions. Small group videotape viewing 
sessions were conducted at the Clinical Psychology Center 
on the University of Montana campus. Each session was 
conducted by an undergraduate psychology student who was 
blind to the experimental hypotheses. Subjects first 
received a written introduction to the eyewitness videotape 
(see Appendix 6) which provided information about the pur­
pose of the study, facts pertinent to the crime being tried, 
and important points made in the defendant's previous 
testimony.
After subjects completed reading this brief introduction, 
subjects viewed one of the eyewitness testimony (high or low 
confidence) videotapes. Subsequently, subjects in the two 
control conditions completed a cover sheet (age, sex, year 
in college) and the dependent measures, since this was the 
only videotape they viewed. Participants in the expert 
testimony conditions and in the expert plus opposing expert 
testimony conditions were given, additionally, a written 
introduction to the expert testimony videotape (see 
Appendices 7 and 8) describing the experience and expertise 
of the testifying psychologist. Subjects in the expert 
plus opposing expert testimony condition then read a third 
introduction prior to viewing the opposing expert videotape. 
After completing the videotape viewings, subjects in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 49
experimental conditions filled out cover sheets and 
completed the dependent measures.
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Eyewitness Testimony Videotapes
Common Characteristics of Eyewitness Videotapes 
Both eyewitness videotapes were the same as those used 
by Fox (Note 1) and Weisser (Note 2). Both tapes pertain to 
the same crime, the robbery of a 7—11 convenience store and 
the murder of the store's clerk (see Appendices 1 and 2).
The eyewitness to the crime, who was also the store manager, 
was working in the stockroom at the back of the store when 
he heard an argument and then a gunshot. He ran to the 
front of the store and saw two robbers emptying the cash 
register, and another holding a gun; his store clerk was 
lying on the floor, motionless. The gunman yelled to the 
other robbers to leave the store and then fired a shot at 
the eyewitness which narrowly missed. All three criminals 
ran out of the store, the gunman stumbling on his way out, 
and down the street to a car parked out of sight. The 
eyewitness briefly turned his attention to the murdered 
clerk prior to telephoning the police. He provided the 
police with a description of the crime sequence and the 
gunman. After a month, the eyewitness identified the 
defendant as the gunman at a one-on-one "showup" at the 
police station jail cell.
In both videotapes, the prosecution initially interro­
gated the eyewitness with simple, straightforward questions. 
Subsequently, the eyewitness was questioned by the defense 
attorney in a more challenging and confrontive tone which 
required more explicit and detailed answers.
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Low Confidence Videotape (See Appendix 1)
In the low confidence videotape, the eyewitness was 
hesitant, uncertain, and inconsistent in his testimony.
The witness conveyed a marked lack of confidence through 
the use of verbal qualifiers ("I guess....", "i think....", 
"If I'm not mistaken ...."), which have been shown 
empirically to portray low confidence (Wells and Lindsay, 
1982) . To further illustrate low confidence, the script 
for this videotape was written to include questioning 
forms (rising intonation at the end of declarative 
statements) and hesitation forms (e.g., "uh", "well",
"you know") which have been shown to communicate a 
"powerless" style of speech (Erickson, Lind, Johnson, 
and O 'Barr, 1978).
High Confidence Videotape (See Appendix 2)
In the high confidence videotape (the same male 
actor used in the low confidence videotape), the eyewit­
ness was confident, self-assured, and consistent in his 
testimony. He used phrases which expressed his certainty, 
such as "I'm sure...", "I'm certain...", and "I could 
never forget.,.", instead of verbal qualifiers which 
communicated low confidence. His responses to question­
ing were straightforward and he confidently identified 
the defendant as the gunman.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 52
Expert Testimony Videotapes
Relevant Factors Expert Testimony (See Appendix 3)
The videotape was the same as that used in the Fox 
(Note 1) and Weisser (Note 2) studies, and was origin­
ally derived from Wells, Linsday and Tousignant (198 0). 
In this tape, the psychologist discussed twelve specific 
factors affecting eyewitness perception and memory that 
were highly relevant to the case being tried. These 
twelve factors are highlighted below:
1. "Physical" factors affecting eyewitness performance, 
such as distance of eyewitness from the criminal, 
lighting conditions, and the effects of rapid movements;
2. Length of observation of the criminal during the 
crime?
3. Length of time between witnessing a crime and recall 
of identification of the criminal;
4. Stress effects;
5. Tendency of eyewitness to overestimate the duration 
of a crime;
6. "Weapon focus", the presence of a weapon has 
distracting effects on the eyewitness;
7. Negative effects of a violent or emotionally loaded 
incident;
8. Effects of the number of criminals involved in the 
crime;
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9. Uniqueness vs. typicality of the criminal's face;
10. "Unconscious transference", where a person seen in 
one situation is confused with and recalled as a person 
seen in a second situation;
11. Effects of a biased lineup or "showup"; and
12. Effects of police pressure on an eyewitness.
The psychologist's testimony ended by summarizing some 
general aspects of eyewitness testimony and by providing 
a review of the twelve relevant factors listed above.
The psychologist was first questioned by the defense 
lawyer, and then interrogated by the prosecuting attorney.
Opposing Psychologist Expert Testimony (See Appendix 4) 
This videotape was similar to the Relevant Factors 
Expert Testimony videotape except that the psychologist 
provided specific factors affecting eyewitness perception 
and memory that cast doubt on the expert testimony provided 
by the first expert, and gave support to the notion that 
eyewitness testimony is generally reliable and useful.
These factors included the following:
1. Eyewitness accuracy and viewing conditions;
2. Effects of eyewitness confidence;
3. Generalizability of eyewitness research;
4. Effects of staged crimes ;
5. Procedural differences in identifications (lineups 
versus photo arrays);
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6. Effects of the use of college students as subject- 
jurors;
7. Need for additional research?
8. Effects of using statistical averages to predict 
eyewitness accuracy (ignoring individual differences);
9. Positive effects of stress;
10. Unknown effects of multiple factors affecting 
eyewitness testimony?
11. "Weapon focus";
12. The effects of expert psychological testimony.
The psychologist’s testimony ended by summarizing and 
reviewing the twelve opposing relevant factors concerning 
research in the area of eyewitness and expert t e s t i m o n y  
listed above. The psychologist was only questioned by 
the prosecuting attorney.
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Dependent Measures (See Appendix 5)
A maximum of seventeen questions were employed as 
dependent measures; eleven questions for the control 
condition^ fourteen questions for the expert testimony 
only condition^ and seventeen questions for the expert 
testimony plus opposing expert testimony condition.
First subjects were asked to indicate whether they 
believed the witness had identified the gunman or 
an innocent person using a dichotomous question (Wells, 
Ferguson, and Lindsay, 1981). Subjects were subsequently 
asked to rate (1) how confident they were of that 
decision on a ten-point Likert scale; (2) the probability 
of the defendant's guilt on a ten-point Likert scale ;
(3) how confident they thought the witness was in his 
ability to identify the gunman; (4) what percentage of
people they would expect to make a correct identification 
under the circumstances described by the eyewitness; 
and (5) to what extent they believed they could generally 
tell from a witness's confidence in his testimony 
whether or not the eyewitness made an accurate identifica­
tion (Wells, Lindsay, and Ferguson, 1979). Subjects 
were then asked to indicate on Likert-type scales 
the percentage of eyewitness testimony in general 
they thought was accurate (Hosch, Beck, and McIntyre,
1980). Additional ten-point Likert scale questions
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(Fox, Note 1; Weisser, Note 2) asked subjects to assess 
how much they relied upon the eyewitness's description 
of the crime, the eyewitness's confidence, and the 
psychologist's or opposing psychologist's expert testi­
mony in deciding whether they thought the eyewitness 
had identified the gunman or an innocent person (the 
questions regarding expert testimony were not given 
to the two control conditions), Likert-scale questions 
also asked subjects to rate the realism of the eyewitness 
videotapes and the expert testmony videotapes (not 
given to the two control conditions). Subjects in 
the expert testimony conditions were asked if they 
recognized the psychologists and how much each psycholo­
gist influenced his or her decision about whether 
the eyewitness had identified the gunman or an innocent 
person. Finally, a question asked the subject-jurors 
to describe in their own words how they decided that 
the eyewitness had identified the gunman or an innocent 
person (Fox, Note 1; Weisser, Note 2).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III 
RESULTS
Gunman vs. Innocent Person Decision
65% of subjects assigned to the Control conditions 
believed that the eyewitness accurately chose the gun­
man; versus 15% of subjects exposed to relevant factors 
Expert Testimony Only^ and 53% of subjects viewing 
Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony videotapes.
4 2% of subjects exposed to the High Confidence 
eyewitness conditions believed the eyewitness had 
accurately identified the gunman, compared to 47% of 
subjects who viewed the Low Confidence eyewitness.
The following table summarizes the percentage of 
subjects in each condition who believed that the eye­
witness accurately identified the gunman:
Table 1 : Percentage of 
Believed the Eyewitness
Subjects in Each Condition Who 
Accurately Identified the Gunman
(n = 20 in each cell)
High Confidence Low Confidence
Eyewitness Eyewitness
No Expert Testimony (control) 50% 80%
Expert Testimony Only 15% 15%
Expert Testimony Plus 45% 60%Opposing Expert Testimony
57
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Chi squares were performed to test the null hypothesis 
that there is no association between the subjects* exper­
imental condition and the proportion of subjects who 
hslieved the eyewitness had identified the gunman or an 
innocent person. Results of the chi square analysis 
suggest that there is a dependence between subjects' 
condition and who they identified. More specifically, 
in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions, approx­
imately equivalent numbers of subjects believed that 
the eyewitness had identified the gunman and an innocent 
person. However, a larger proportion of subjects in the 
Expert Only conditions believed the eyewitness had 
identified the innocent person; while in the Control 
conditions, the majority of subjects believed the eye­
witness had identified the gunman. The following 3 X 2  
table summarizes these results:
Table 2: Chi Square Analysis - Condition by Gunman vs.
Innocent Person Decision
Gunman Innocent Person
No Expert Testimony (control) 26 14
Expert Testimony Only 6 34
Expert Testimony Plus 21 19
Opposing Expert Testimony 
x^ = 21.97, df = 2, j g < . 0 5
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Because the chi square for Condition was significant, 
subsequent chi square analyses were performed to determine 
which Conditions differed significantly from each other 
in regard to the gunman versus innocent person decision 
and were tested at Bonferroni levels of significance.
The chi square tests revealed that there is a significant 
difference between the Expert Only and the Expert Plus 
Opposing Expert Testimony Conditions; and between the 
Control (No Expert Testimony) and Expert Only Conditions. 
The Control and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony 
Conditions did not differ significantly from each other. 
The following 2 X 2  tables (3, 4 and 5) summarize these 
results :
Table 3: Chi Square Analysis - No Expert Testimony
(Control) and Expert Testimony Only Conditions by Gunman 
versus Innocent Person decision
Gunman Innocent Person
No Expert Testimony (Control) 26 14
Expert Testimony Only 6 3 4
x^ = 20.83, d^ = 1 , 2  ^ "05 Bonferroni
Table 4: Chi Square Analysis - No Expert Testimony
(Control) and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony 
Conditions by Gunman versus Innocent Person Decision
Gunman Innocent Person
No Expert Testimony (Control) 26 14
Expert Plus Opposing Expert 21 19
x^ = 1.29, df = 1, p > .05 Bonferroni
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Table 5: Chi Square Analysis - Expert Testimony Only
and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony Conditions 
by Gunman versus Innocent Person Decision
Gunman Innocent Person
Expert Testimony Only 6 34
Expert Plus Opposing Expert 21 19
2 = 12.58, df = 1, 2 -C.OS Bonferroni
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Another chi square analysis was performed to test 
the null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
level of confidence (high or low) of the eyewitness the 
subjects viewed and whether they believed the eyewitness 
had identified the gunman or an innocent person. The 
chi square results provide support for the null hypo­
thesis. The following 2 X 2  table summarizes these 
results :
Table 6: Chi Square Analysis - Level of Confidence by
Gunman versus Innocent Person Decision
Low Confidence 
High Confidence
= .30, d^ = 1, p > .05
Gunman Innocent Person 
25 35
28 32
An additional chi square was executed to test the 
null hypothesis that there is no relationship between 
the frequency of identifying the gunman or an innocent 
person based upon the sex of subject. The chi square 
results provide support for the null hypothesis. The 
following 2 X 2  table summarizes these results:
Table Chi Square Analysis - Sex of Subject by
Gunman versus Innocent Person Decision
Male Subjects 
Female Subjects
Gunman Innocent Person 
31 29
22 38
X = 2.74, df = 1, p > .05
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Decision Confidence
Subjects were asked to rate their confidence in 
their decision as to whether the eyewitness identified 
the gunman or an innocent person. Mean scores on a 
ten-point Likert scale for each of the twelve individual 
groups are provided below in Table 8 (the higher the 
score, the greater the level of decision confidence 
indicated). The mean confidence rating for the Control 
conditions was 5,95; Expert Testimony Only conditions 
was 6.83; Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony condi­
tions was 6.15. Subjects in the Low Confidence condi­
tions obtained a mean confidence rating of 6.03; while 
those in the High Confidence conditions reported a 
mean confidence rating of 6.58. Males reported a mean 
confidence rating of 6.5, while females' mean confidence 
rating was 6.12. A 3 X 2 X 2  (condition by confidence 
by sex of subject); analysis of variance revealed no
Table 8: Means for Each Group on Subjects' Ten-Point
Likert Scale Ratings of their Confidence in the Gunman 
versus Innocent Person Decision (10 = absolutely con­
fident, 1 = not at all confident)
No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only
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Table 9: 3 X 2 X 2  Analysis of variance of ratings
of confidence on the gunman versus innocent person decision
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F SignificanceSquares Square of F
Condition 16.82 2 8.41 1 .89 .15Confidence 9. 08 1 9.08 2.04 .15Condition X Confidence 0. 35 2 0.18 0.04 . 96Sex of Subject 4. 41 1 4.41 0.99 .68Condition X Sex of S 25. 32 2 12.67 2.85 . 06Confidence X Sex of S 0. 21 1 0. 21 0. 05 . 82Condition X Confidence 11.32 2 5.66 1. 27 . 28
X Sex of Subject
Error 480.10 108 4.45
Total 547.59 119
significant effects, although the Condition by Sex of 
Subject interaction approached significance (P = .06). 
Table 9 provides the ANOVA data.
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Guilt
Subjects were asked to rate the probability of the 
defendant's guilt on a ten—point Likert scale (1 = 
definitely not guilty, 10 = definitely guilty). Mean 
scores for each group are shown in Table 10. The mean 
rating of guilt in the Control conditions was 5,63; in 
the Expert Testimony Only conditions, the mean was 
3.80; and the Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony 
conditions reported a mean of 5.88. Mean guilt rating 
for subjects in the Low Confidence conditions was 5.15, 
compared to 5.05 in the High Confidence conditions.
Mean guilt rating for Males was 5.43, while for Females 
it was 4.77 (See Table 10). A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of 
variance revealed a significant main effect for condi­
tion. See Table 11 for the ANOVA. Subsequent Newman- 
Keuls pairwise comparisons found that the Expert Only 
groups' guilt rating (X = 3.80, n = 40) differed signif­
icantly from both the Control grups' (X = 5.63, n = 40) 
and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony groups'
(X = 5.86, n = 40) guilt ratings, which did not differ 
significantly from each other. In addition, the main 
effect for Sex of Subject (jp = .0969) and the Condition 
by Confidence interaction (p = .0649) approached signif­
icance .
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Table 10: Means for each group on subjects' ten-point 
Likert scale ratings of the probability of the defen­
dant's guilt (1 = definitely not guilty, 10 = definitely guilty
Low Confidence High ConfidenceEyewitness Eyewitness
Male Female Male Female
No Expert Testimony 6.2 6.2 5.6 4.5
Expert Testimony Only 4.2 3.7 3.8 3.5
Expert Plus Opposing 5.5 5.1 7.3 5.6Expert Testimony
Table 11 : Analysis of variance of ratings of probability
of defendant's guilt
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F Significance
Squares Square of F
Condition 102.65 2 51.33 10.54 .0002
Confidence .30 1 0.30 0.06 .7999
Condition X Confidence 27.05 2 13. 53 2.78 .0649
Sex of Subject 13.33 1 13.33 2.74 .0969
Condition X Sex of S 2.32 2 1.16 0.24 .7916
Confidence X Sex of S 4.03 1 4.03 0.83 .6322
Condition X Confidence 3.32 2 1.66 0.34 .7172
X Sex of Subject
Error 525.80 108
Total 678.80 119
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Manipulation Check - Eyewitness Confidence Ratings
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point 
Likert scale how confident the eyewitness seemed to 
be in his ability to identify the gunman (1 = not at 
all confident, 10 = definitely confident). Mean 
scores for each group are portrayed in Table 12.
The eyewitness was rated as significantly more confident 
in the High Confidence conditions (X = 9.03) than in 
the Low Confidence conditions (X = 4.75). Significant 
differences between the two groups indicate that the 
manipulation was effective. A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of 
variance revealed a significant main effect for 
Confidence and near significant Condition by Confidence 
(£ = .053) and Confidence by Sex of Subject (£ = .069) 
effects. See Figures 1, 2 and 3 for the graphs of the
effects; see Table 13 for the ANOVA.
Figure 1: Graph of the effect of condition and confidence
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Figure 2: Graph of the effect of condition and confidence
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Table 12: Means for each group on subjects' ten-point 








No Expert Testimony 5.4
Expert Testimony Only 3.6
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Table 13: 3 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of eyewitness 
confidence ratings
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F SignificajSquares Square of F
Condition 4.72 2 2. 36 2.36 .61158Confidence 550.41 1 550.41 117.50 .00001Condition X Confidence 27.92 2 13.96 2.98 .05344Sex of Subject 7.01 1 7.01 1.50 .22165Condition X Sex of S 22. 22 2 11.11 2.37 .09616Confidence X Sex of S 15.41 1 15.41 3.29 .96893Condition X Confidence 10,02 2 5.01 1, 07 .34775X Sex of Subject
Error 505.90 108
Total 1143.59 119
Figure 3: Graph of the effect of confidence and sex of
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Estimated General Percentages of Correct. Identifications
Subjects were asked to make estimates of the percentage 
of people who would make a correct identification under 
the circumstances described by the eyewitness on a 0% - 
100% scale. Table 14 provides a summary of the individual 
group means. Subjects in the Control conditions gave mean 
estimations of the percentage of people who would make a 
correct identification under the circumstances described 
of 51,25%, versus 32.75% in the Expert Only conditions, 
and 49.8 0% in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions. 
Subjects in the Low Confidence conditions estimated that 
45.5% of the population would make a correct identifica­
tion under the given circumstances, versus 4 3.7% in the 
High Confidence conditions. Males' mean estimation was 
54.33% compared to 34,87% for Females. A 3 X 2 X 2 
analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect 
for Sex of Subject? Males gave significantly higher ratings 
than did Females. See Table 15 for the ANOVA. An inter­
action of condition by level of confidence indicates that 
under the Control conditions, subjects exposed to the 
High Confidence eyewitness gave smaller percentage estimates 
of the people who would make a correct identification under 
circumstances similar to those described by the eyewitness 
compared to subjects exposed to the Low Confidence witness, 
who gave higher percentage estimates of correct identifica-
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tions under similar circumstances. In the Expert Only 
conditions. High and Low Confidence groups differed only 
slightly, and both provided low estimates of the per­
centage of people who would make a correct identification 
under the circumstances described. In the Expert Plus 
Opposing Expert Testimony conditions. High Confidence 
groups gave higher estimates of the percentage of people 
who would make a correct identification under the cir­
cumstances described by the eyewitness than did Low 
Confidence groups. Subsequent Newman—Keuls pairwise 
comparisons revealed that only the following specific 
pairs of means differed significantly: Low Confidence
Control differed significantly from High Confidence 
Expert Only and Low Confidence Expert Only; High Con­
fidence Expert Plus Opposing Expert differed significantly 
from High Confidence and Low Confidence Expert Only con­
ditions .
Table 14: Mean percentages for each group on subjects'
Likert—type estimations of the percentage of people who 
would make a correct identification under the circum­
stances described by the eyewitness
Low Confidence High Confidence
Eyewitness Eyewitness
Male Female Male Female
No Expert Testimony 68% 50% 57% 30%
Expert Testimony Only 39% 25% 43% 24%
Expert Plus Opposing 54% 37% 65% 43%
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Table 15: 3 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of estimated
general percentage of correct identifications
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F SignificancSquares Square of F
Condition 8467.40 2 4233.70 9.24 .00040Confidence 97. 20 1 97.20 .21 .65101Condition X Confidence 3067.40 2 1533.70 3.35 .03773Sex of Subject 11368.50 1 11368.50 24.80 .00003Condition X Sex of S 180.07 2 90. 03 .20 .82368Confidence X Sex of S 294.53 1 294.53 .64 .56980Condition X Confidence 28. 07 2 14.03 .03 .97036X Sex of Subject
Error 49501.60 10 8 458.35
Total 73004.80 119
Figure 4: Graph of interaction of condition and confidence
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Belief in Eyewitness Confidence as an Indicator of Accuracy
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point Likert 
scale the extent to which one can tell from an eyewitness* 
confidence whether or not the eyewitness made a correct 
identification {1 = can almost never tell if eyewitness 
is accurate, 10 = can almost always tell if eyewitness is 
accurate). Subjects in the Control conditions reported a 
mean rating of 5.95, compared to those in the Expert Only 
conditions, with a mean rating of 4.35, and those in the 
Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony condition, reporting 
a mean rating of 5.83. Subjects in the Low Confidence 
conditions gave a mean rating of 5.4 5 versus 5.30 in the 
High Confidence conditions. Males mean rating of belief 
in eyewitness confidence as an indicator of accuracy was 
5.48, compared to 5.27 for Females. See Table 16 for the 
means of the individual groups. A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of 
variance revealed a significant main effect for subjects' 
condition. Subsequent Newman-Keuls pairwise comparisons 
indicated that there were no significant differences among 
any pair of groups. See Table 17 for the ANOVA.
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Table 16: Means for each groups on subjects* ten-point
Likert scale ratings of the extent to which eyewitness' 
confidence can be used to infer eyewitness accuracy 
(1 = can almost never tell if eyewitness is accurate,
10 = can almost always tell if eyewitness is accurate)
No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only






















Table 17: 3 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of belief in
eyewitness confidence as an indicator of accuracy
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F Signifie.
Squares Square of F
Condition 174.05 2 87.03 3. 08 . 0485
Conf idence 33. 08 1 33 . 08 1.17 . 2813
Condition X Confidence 51.45 2 25.73 0.91 . 5921
Sex of Subject 37. 41 1 37.41 1. 32 . 2510
Condition X Sex of S 67.92 2 33.96 1. 20 .3043
Confidence X Sex of S 6. 08 1 6, 08 0.22 .6488
Condition X Confidence 36.65 2 18.33 0.65 .5295
X Sex of Subject
Error 3050.70 108 28 . 25
Total 2457.33
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Estimated General Percentage of Accurate Eyewitness
Testimony
Subjects were asked to estimate on a Likert-type 
scale the general percentage of eyewitness testimony 
that is accurate. Subjects in the Control conditions 
estimated that 61% of eyewitness testimony is accurate, 
compared to 4 7.5% in the Expert Only conditions and 
57.25% in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions 
(see Table 18 for the means of the individual groups). 
Subjects in the Low Confidence conditions estimated 
that 55.8 3% of eyewitness testimony is accurate, versus 
54.6 7% in the High Confidence conditions. Male subjects 
estimated that 61.67% of eyewitness testimony is accurate, 
compared to 48.83% for Female subjects. A 3 X 2 X 2 
analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect 
for condition. Subsequent Newman-Keuls pairwise com­
parisons indicate that the Control groups (X = 61.0, 
n = 40) differ significantly from the Expert Only groups 
(X = 4 7.5, n = 40) but not from the Expert Plus Opposing 
Expert groups (X = 57.25, n = 4 0); and that the Expert 
Only groups differ significantly from the Expert Plus 
Opposing Expert groups. In addition, a significant main 
effect for sex of subject was revealed, with Males giving 
significantly higher percentages (X = 61.7%) that eye­
witness testimony is accurate than Females (X = 48.83). 
See Table 19 for the ANOVA.
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Table 18: Means for each group on subjects' Likert-
type estimations of the general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony
Low Confidence High ConfidenceEyewitness Eyewitness
Male! Female Male FCTiale
No Expert Testimony 72% 56% 63% 53%
Expert Testimony Only 55% 41% 56% 38%
Expert Testimony Plus 58% 53% 66% 52%Opposing Expert Testimony
Table 19: 3 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of estimated
general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F Signifie;
Squares Square of F
Condition 3885.00 2 1942.50 4. 80 . 0101
Confidence 40,83 1 40.83 .10 .7500
Condition X Confidence 451.67 2 224.83 .56 .5795
Sex of Subject 4940.83 1 4940. 83 12. 20 . 0010
Condition X Sex of S 211.67 2 105.83 .26 .7740
Confidence X Sex of S 40.83 1 40.83 .10 . 7500
Condition X Confidence 291.67 2 145.83 .36 .7037
X Sex of Subject
Error 43730.00 108 404.91
Total 53592.50 119
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Eyewitness' Description of Crime as Basis for Gunman/
Innocent Person Decision
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point 
Likert scale how much they based their gunman versus 
innocent person decision on the eyewitness' description 
of the crime (1 = did not base decision on eyewitness' 
description of the crime at all, 10 = based decision 
largely upon eyewitness' description of the crime).
Mean scores for individual groups are displayed in 
Table 20. Control group subjects gave mean ratings 
of 6.98; mean for the Expert Only subjects was 6.40; 
and mean for the Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony 
groups was 6.7 25. The mean of the Low Confidence 
groups was 6.73, and for the High Confidence groups 
it was 6.67. For Males, the mean was 7.03, versus 
6.37 for Females. A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis of variance 
revealed a significant interaction of Condition by 
Confidence by Sex of Subject, and a near significant 
(£ = .056} effect for Sex of Subject. However, sub­
sequent Newman-Keuls pairwise comparisons revealed no 
significant differences among any pair of groups. The 
interaction is portrayed in Figure 5. The ANOVA is 
displayed in Table 21.
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Table 20 : Means for each group on subjects' ten-point
Likert scale ratings of how much they based their gunman 
versus innocent person decision on the eyewitness' descrip­
tion of the crime (10 = based decision largely upon 




No Expert Testimony (Control) 7.0 7.6
Expert Testimony Only 8-0 5.3












Figure 5: Graph of interaction of condition by confidence
by sex of subject at eyewitness' description of crime as 

































Expert Only ConditionsExpert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony Conditions
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Table 21 3 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of description
of crime as a basis of gunman/innocent person decision 
(10 = based decision largely upon eyewitness' description 
of the crime, 1 = did not base decision on eyewitness' 
description of the crime at all)
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F SignifieSquares Square of F
Condition 6.65 2 3.33 .91 . 5902
Confidence .13 1 .13 .04 .8435Condition X Confidence 15.62 2 7.81 2.13 .1220Sex of Subject 13.33 1 13. 33 3.63 . 0561Condition X Sex of S 15.62 2 7.81 2.13 .1220
Confidence X Sex of S 3.33 1 3. 33 .91 .6553Condition X Confidence 24.12 2 12. 06 3. 29 .03996
X Sex of Subject
Error 396.40 108
Total 475.20 119
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Eyewitness Confidence As Bases of Gunman/Innocent
Person Decision
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point 
Likert scale how much their gunman versus innocent 
person decision was based on the eyewitness confidence 
in his testimony (1 = did not base decision on the 
eyewitness' confidence at all, 10 = based decision 
largely upon the eyewitness' confidence). Subjects 
in the Control conditions (X = 6.03) and Expert Plus 
Opposing Expert conditions (X = 5.98) gave higher 
mean ratings than did subjects in the Expert Only 
conditions (X = 4.60). Subjects exposed to Low 
Confidence videotapes based their decision on the 
confidence of the eyewitness more (X = 5.93) than 
subjects in the High Confidence conditions (X = 5.13), 
although this difference was not significant. Males 
(X = 5.98) gave higher mean ratings on this measure 
than did Females (X = 5.08). See Table 22 for the 
means of the individual groups. A 3 X 2 X 2 analysis 
of variance revealed a significant main effect for 
Condition; subjects in both Control and Expert Plus 
Opposing Expert conditions gave higher mean ratings 
of how much they based their gunman versus innocent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 80
person decision on eyewitness confidence than subjects 
in the Expert Only conditions. The Confidence = .08) 
and Sex of Subject (_£ = .051) effects approached signif­
icance. See Table 23 for the ANOVA. Subsequent Newman- 
Keuls pairwise comparison indicated that this effect 
was due to the subjects in the Control and Expert 
Plus Opposing Expert conditions basing their decision 
on eyewitness confidence significantly more than subjects 
in the Expert Only groups; Control and Expert Plus 
Opposing Expert Testimony groups did not differ signif­
icantly from each other.
Table 22: Means for each group on subjects' ten—point
Likert scale ratings of how much they based their gunman 
vs. innocent person decision upon the eyewitness' 
confidence in his testimony <10 = based decision largely 





Male Female Male Female
No Expert Testimony 6,6 5.9 6 .1 5.5
Expert Testimony Only 6-7 4.4 3.7 3.6
Expert Plus Opposing 
Expert Testimony
6.5 5.5 6.3 5.6




3 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of eyewitness 
as basis of gunman vs. innocent person decision
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F Signif i'Squares Square of F
Condition 52.317 2 26.158 4.09 . 0190Confidence 19.200 1 19.200 3. 00 . 0823
Condition X Confidence 18.950 2 9.475 1.48 . 2306
Sex of Subject 24.300 1 24.300 3.80 . 0509
Condition X Sex of S 1 . 550 2 O i 775 0.12 . 0886
Confidence X Sex of S 5.633 1 5.633 0.88 .6474
Condition X Confidence 6.717 2 3. 358 0. 53 .5988
X Sex of Subject
Error 691.200 108 6.400
Total 819.867 119
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Eyewitness Testimony - Realism Ratings
Subjects were asked to rate their agreement on a 
ten-point Likert scale with the following statement:
"The film presented a realistic example of an eye­
witness testimony" (1 = strongly disagree, 1 0 =  strongly 
agree). Mean realism ratings were sufficiently high 
scross groups, with an overall mean of 6.43 (n = 120);
Ihe means of the individual groups are displayed in 
Table 2 4. A 3 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of subjects' 
realism ratings revealed no significant differences 
among the cells, although the Condition effect approached 
significance = .056). See Table 25 for the ANOVA.
Table 2 4: Means for each group on subjects' ten—point
Likert scale ratings of their agreement with the state­
ment that the videotape presented a realistic example 













7 . 2 6.8 6.7 5.2
7.6 7.0 6.9 6.8
6.3 5.9 6 . 2 4.6
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Table 25: 3 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of eyewitness
testimony realism ratings for individual groups
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F SignifiSquares Square of F
Condition 35.22 2 17.61 2.94 . 0555Conf idence 16.13 1 16.13 2.69 . 0997Condition X Confidence 1.82 2 .91 .15 .8599Sex of Subject 17.63 1 17.63 2. 94 .0852Condition X Sex of S 2.62 2 1.31 . 22 .8065Confidence X Sex of S 2.70 1 2.70 .45 . 5105Condition X Confidence 4.55 2 2. 28 . 38 .6904X Sex of Subject
Error 646.80 108 5.99
Total 727,47
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Expert Testimony As a Basis of Subjects' Gunman/
Innocent Person Decision
Subjects in the Expert Testimony groups were asked 
to indicate how much they based their gunman versus 
innocent person decision upon the expert testimony on 
a ten-point Likert scale {1 = did not base decision 
on the psychologist's expert testimony at all, 10 = 
based decision largely upon the psychologist's expert 
testimony). Subjects in the Expert Testimony Only 
conditions gave mean basis of decision ratings of 
6.23, compared to mean ratings of 5.18 in the Expert 
Plus Opposing Expert Testimony conditions. See Table 
2 6 for the means of the individual groups. A 2 X 2 X 2 
analysis of variance revealed no significant differences 
among any of the cells, although the Condition effect 
approached significance (_£ = .06) as did the Confidence 
effect (£ = .06). See Table 24 for the ANOVA.
Table 2 6: Means for each group on subjects’ ten-point
Likert scale ratings of how much they based their gun­
man vs. innocent person decision upon expert testimony 
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Table 27: 2 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of expert
testimony as a basis of gunman versus innocent person 
decision
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F SignifieSquares Square of F
Condition 22. 05 1 22.05 3.49 .0626Conf idence 1.80 1 1.80 . 29 . 0618Condition X Confidence 11.25 1 11. 25 1.78 .1833Sex of Subject 8.45 1 8.45 1 .34 .2501
Condition X Sex of S 5. 00 1 5.00 .79 .6196Confidence X Sex of S 4.05 1 4. 05 .64 ,5682Condition X Confidence 5. 00 1 5.00 .79 . 6196X Sex of Subject
Error 455.20 72 6.32
Total 512.80 79
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Realism Ratings of Expert Testimony by First Psychologist
Subjects in the Expert Testimony Only and Expert 
Plus Opposing Expert Testimony conditions were asked 
to indicate on a ten-point Likert scale their agreement 
with the following statement: "The film presented a
realistic and believable example of a psychologist 
(Dr. Walters) giving testimony on research in the area 
of eyewitness testimony" (10 = strongly agree, 1 = 
strongly disagree). Mean realism ratings of all groups 
were adequately high (Overall mean = 6.58, n = 80) and 
are presented in Table 2 8, A 2 X 2 X 2 analysis of 
variance of subjects' ratings of realism revealed no 
significant differences among any of the cells, al­
though the Condition effect = .0500) approached 
significance. See Table 2 9 for the ANOVA.
Table 2 8: Means for each group on subjects* ten-point
Likert scale ratings of their agreement with the state­
ment that the film presented a realistic example of a 
psychologist giving expert testimony <10 = strongly 
agree, 1 = strongly disagree)
No Expert Testimony
Expert Testimony Only
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Table 2 9: 2 X 2 X 2  analysis of variance of expert
testimony realism ratings for individual groups
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F Signif i<Squares Square of F
Condition 22.05 1 22. 05 3.87 . 0500Conf idence 1.25 1 1. 25 . 22 .6459Condition X Confidence 4.05 1 4.05 .71 . 5934Sex of Subject 1.25 1 1.25 . 22 .6459Condition X Sex of S 8.45 1 8.45 1.48 . 2250Confidence X Sex of S .45 1 .45 . 08 .7762Condition X Confidence 4.05 1 4.05 . 71 .5934X Sex of Subject
Error 410.00 72
Total 451.55 79
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Realism Ratings of Expert Testimony by Second Psychologist
Subjects in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony 
condition were asked to indicate on a ten-point Likert 
scale their agreement with the following statement:
"The film presented a realistic and believable example 
of a psychologist (Dr. Watkins) giving testimony on 
research in the area of eyewitness testimony" (1 = 
strongly disagree, 10 = strongly agree). Mean realism 
ratings of all groups were acceptably high and are 
displayed in Table 30. A 2 X 2 analysis of variance 
revealed no significant differences among any of the 
cells. See Table 31 for the ANOVA.
Table 30: Means for each group on subjects' ten—point
Likert scale ratings of their agreement with the state­
ment that the film presented a realistic example of a 
psychologist giving expert testimony (10 = strongly 





Expert Plus Opposing 
Expert Testimony
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Table 31: 2 X 2  analysis of variance of expert testimony
realism ratings for individual groups
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F Signif ica:Squares Square of F
Confidence 9. 025 1 9.025 1.367 .2487Sex of Subject 1.225 1 1.225 0.186 .6728Confidence X Sex of S . 250 1 . 250 .004 .9499Error 237.700 36
Total 247.975 39
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Effect of Opposing Psychologist on Gunman/Innocent 
Person Decision
Subjects were asked to indicate on a ten-point 
Likert scale the extent to which the opposing (second) 
psychologist's (Dr. Watkins) testimony affected their 
decision concerning whether they thought the eyewitness 
had identified the gunman or an innocent person (1 = 
did not based decision on the second psychologist's 
expert testimony at all, 10 = based decision largely 
upon the second psychologist's expert testimony). In 
the Low Confidence conditions, subjects gave a mean 
rating of 4.60, compared to 4.0 5 in the High Con­
fidence conditions. Males provided higher mean ratings 
(X = 4.90) than did Females (X = 3.75). Means for the 
individual groups are portrayed in Table 32. A 2 X 2 
analysis of variance revealed no significant differences 
among the groups. The ANOVA is displayed in Table 33.
Table 3 2: Means for each group on subjects' ten-point 
Likert Scale ratings of the effect of the opposing
psychologist on their gunman vs. innocent person decision
(10 = based decision largely on the second psychologist's 
expert testimony)
Low Confidence High Confidence
Eyewitness  Eyewitness_____
Male Female Male Female
Expert Testimony Plus 5.6 3.6 4.2 3.9
Opposing Expert Testimony
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Table 3 3: 2 X 2  analysis of variance of effect of
opposing psychologist on subjects' gunman versus 
innocent person decision
Source of variation Sum of df Mean F SignificanceSquares Square of F
Confidence 3.025 1 3. 025 0.541 .5266Sex of Subject 13.225 1 13.225 2.365 .1292Confidence X Sex of S 7. 225 1 7.225 1.292 .2623Error 201.300 36 5.592
Total 224.775 39
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Familiarity with Experts Giving Testimony on Eyewitness
Research
Subjects in the Expert Testimony Only and Expert 
Plus Opposing Expert Testimony conditions were asked 
if they had ever seen the expert(s) depicted in the 
videotape(s) before (yes or no) and, if so, in what 
capacity (open-ended question). In the Expert Only 
conditions, only two (2) out of forty (40) subjects 
had seen Dr. Walters before. In the Expert Plus 
Opposing Expert Testimony conditions, zero (0) out 
of forty (40) subjects had seen Dr. Walters previous­
ly, and only two (2) out of forty (40) subjects were 
familiar with Dr. Watkins. Chi square tests suggest 
support for the null hypothesis that both psycholo­
gists would be equally well known to subjects in both 
conditions (x^ < (D , 2 ^ .05) .
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
As hypot±iesized, significant differences were 
found among the groups in regard to whether subjects 
believed that the eyewitness giving testimony had 
identified the gunman who committed the crime or an 
innocent person. Expert Testimony Only subjects 
showed a significant reduction in their belief that 
the eyewitness accurately chose the gunman compared 
to Control Group subjects, who did not hear any 
expert testimony. Subjects who were exposed to 
both Expert and Opposing Expert Testimony had re­
duced belief in the eyewitness when compared to Control 
subjects, but believed that the eyewitness had 
accurately identified the gunman more often than 
those exposed to only the Expert Testimony. These 
findings follow logically from those of Fox (Note 1), 
but fail to replicate Weisser's (Note 2) results;
Fox (Note 1) found similar expert testimony effects 
while Weisser (Note 2) did not. As Kazdin (1980) 
has pointed out, the importance of replication in 
scientific research cannot be overemphasized. This 
study is the second attempt to replicate Fox (Note 1),
93
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a sort of ”tie-breaker" in this series of eyewitness 
testimony studies. Also, the results lend support to 
the notion that Weisser's (Note 2) results may have 
been related to sampling variability rather than the 
fact that jurors already possess the knowledge about 
eyewitness testimony that is usually provided by the 
expert psychologist. Perhaps more importantly, such 
results suggest that opposing expert testimony may be 
used successfully by the prosecution to mitigate the 
impact of the use of expert testimony by the defense 
counsel.
A factor which has not yet been researched exten­
sively in the eyewitness testimony/expert witness area, 
sex of subject, was found to not be related to subjects' 
belief in whether the eyewitness identified the gunman 
or an innocent person. This result provides some 
elucidation to one of the questions which have not 
yet been answered as to which subject-juror variables 
effect decision making, such as age, sex, education, 
religion, etc. Certainly, subject-juror variables 
warrant further, detailed examination to enhance 
jury selection and create a juror profile. The 
evidence provided herein in this regard is somewhat 
circumscribed in that it is relevant only to the
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specific circumstances surrounding the instant case.
As expected. Expert Testimony alone significantly 
reduced guilt ratings and the belief that the eye­
witness had correctly identified the gunman. In 
addition, subjects in the Expert Testimony Only con­
dition reported the highest mean decision confidence 
ratings, although these results did not attain 
statistical significance. Together, these findings 
suggest that the Expert Testimony by itself did 
significantly affect subjects; that is, subjects 
were more confident in their decision that the eye­
witness identified an innocent person and they were 
less likely to believe the eyewitness had identified 
the gunman. Thus, there is strong support for the 
impact of psychological expert testimony on subjects' 
belief in an eyewitness.
Subjects who viewed Expert Testimony Only tapes 
had significantly lower estimates of the percentage 
of people who would make a correct identification 
under the circumstances described than subjects in 
the Control conditions, who were not exposed to expert 
testimony, but only in the Low Confidence groups.
This implies that subjects found the expert's inform- 
tion useful in their appraisal of a low confidence
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eyewitness; they found the eyewitness less credible 
as a result of the expert testimony, and apparently 
felt that eyewitnesses exposed to similar circumstances 
would be inaccurate. In the High Confidence condi­
tions, subjects who viewed both Expert and Opposing 
Expert Testimony tapes had significantly higher ratings 
of the percentage of people who would make a correct 
identification under the circumstances described than 
those who viewed only the Expert Testimony videotape. 
Apparently a high confidence eyewitness retains 
credibility despite expert testimony both supporting 
and discounting the reliability of eyewitness testimony. 
Similarly, subjects in the Expert Only conditions 
gave significantly lower estimated general percentages 
of accurate eyewitness testimony than subjects in 
the Control and Expert Plus Opposing Expert Testimony 
conditions. This supports the efficacy of utilizing 
expert testimony to reduce jurors* belief in the guilt 
of a defendant when those beliefs are dependent on 
eyewitness testimony. In estimating percentages of 
accurate eyewitness testimony, males gave significantly 
higher percentage estimates than did females; implying 
that males found the eyewitness' testimony more 
credible and were affected less by the expert's testi­
mony. Groups, however, did not differ significantly
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on ratings of how much they based their gunman versus 
innocent person decision on the eyewitness* descrip­
tion of the crime.
The manipulation check showed that subjects 
perceived the high confidence eyewitness as signif­
icantly more confident than the low confidence 
eyewitness, as expected. However, the near—significant 
interaction of Confidence with Condition suggests that 
subjects in the Control Conditions were affected more 
by the confidence of the eyewitness than subjects in 
the other two conditions. In addition, the interaction 
of Confidence and Sex of Subject also closely approached 
significance, suggesting that males were affected more 
by the confidence of the eyewitness than were females. 
Realism ratings showed that both types of expert testi­
mony and both eyewitness videotape segments were viewed 
by subjects as believable, increasing the generalizability 
of the results. Both the manipulation check results and 
realism ratings are consistent with findings obtained 
in the Fox (Note 1) and Weisser (Note 2) studies, which 
utilized several.of the same videotapes.
In regard to the effects of the confidence variable, 
the hypothesis that expert testimony would have more 
influence on the subjects' belief in whether the eye­
witness had identified the gunman or an innocent person
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in the high eyewitness confidence condition than in 
the low confidence condition was not supported. This 
result replicates the Fox (Note 1) findings. Subjects 
in the Expert Testimony Only groups had the lowest 
ratings of belief in eyewitness confidence as an 
indicator of accuracy, although this difference was 
not significant. In addition. Expert Testimony alone 
was effective in significantly reducing subjects' 
reported reliance on eyewitness confidence as a basis 
of their gunman versus innocent person decision.
Thus, subjects were markedly influenced by the com­
pelling arguments presented by the first expert against 
overreliance on expert testimony. These effects, how­
ever, were mitigated when subjects were exposed to the 
strong arguments of the opposing expert in favor of 
eyewitness testimony; that is, mean ratings in the 
Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions returned to 
similar levels to those given by Control subjects not 
exposed to expert testimony at all in regard to con­
fidence variables.
Subjects in the Expert Testimony Only conditions 
based their gunman versus innocent person decision on 
the Expert Testimony more than subjects in the Expert 
Plus Opposing Expert Testimony conditions (nearly
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significant). In the latter conditions, subjects gave only 
moderate mean ratings of the extent to which the opposing 
psychologist's testimony affected their gunman versus in­
nocent person decision. One might hypothesize that in the 
Expert Only conditions, subjects received clear and dir­
ectional messages about the unreliability of eyewitness 
testimony, making their gunman versus innocent person deci­
sion much simpler. However, in the Expert Plus Opposing 
Expert conditions, subjects received opposing messages from 
equally credible experts, creating a situation of dissonance 
for the subject—jurors. Also, order effects may have been 
partially responsible for the differences. Perhaps the 
latter subjects had to rely on other factors more to make 
their final decision; and such subjects may have fallen back 
on eyewitness confidence as a deciding factor. In fact, 
responses to the open-ended question regarding how the sub­
jects made their gunman versus innocent person decision 
provide some support for these hypotheses. For example, 
several subjects who believed the eyewitness had identified 
the gunman had relied upon their own impression that it 
would be very difficult to forget the criminal's face under 
the circumstances described, and that they would remember 
the criminal's face for over a month (consistent with the 
Wells and Lindsay (1983) metamemory theory, specifically 
conditional information or acting on "self-based judgments);
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some mentioned that the eyewitness had remembered the 
rest of the crime so clearly that he would also remember 
the criminal's face; and others noted that the lighting 
would be good in a convenience store such as the one 
described in the videotape. On the other hand, subjects 
in the Expert Plus Opposing Expert conditions who 
believed that the eyewitness had identified an innocent 
person relied on the lack of corroborating evidence, 
the fact that the eyewitness had never actually witnessed 
the shooting, and that a reasonable doubt remained as to 
the defendant's guilt. Confidence was cited as a factor 
both by subjects who believed the eyewitness had identi­
fied an innocent person, and by those who believed he 
had identified the gunman.
Limitations of the present study include the brevity 
of both eyewitness and expert testimony, the lack of 
portrayal of cross-examination, the fact that subjects 
were aware that the events were simulated, and that only 
one type of crime with only one eyewitness and certain 
experts were included in the investigation. Future 
research is needed to explore such variables as the 
order of presentation of the experts, the demographic 
factors associated with both the eyewitness and the 
experts (e.g., age, sex, appearance, etc.), effects of 
type of crime portrayed (e.g., violent, non—violent, sexual), 
and how each of these factors and others interact with 
each other and with specific juror characteristics.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by blind experimental 
assistant) - "At the beginning of this portion of the 
videotape of the trial, the prosecuting attorney asked 
the eyewitness to state his name and occupation."
Prosecution
Witness: My name is, ah, Roy Wilkins. Ah - I'm themanager of the 7-11 store.
Prosecutor: Describe in your own words what happenedthe night of November 14, 1981.
W: Well, I was - I was in the back of the store, ah,
um, working. Larry, that's Larry Gelbart, was out front 
at - at the register. Ah, business was slow that night 
and I'd gone back to get some stock for the shelves, ah, just to keep busy, you see.
P: And what time was this?
W: Ummm... let's see, oh, it must have been pretty close
to 11:30, I'd say.
P: And what happened then?
W: Well, I — first I thought I heard somebody talking -
talking kind of loud out front, it ah - it sounded to me 
as if maybe Larry was in an argument with somebody, and
so I - I decided to go out and — and see what was — what
was going on. About the time I thought I should go on 
out, ah, it seems that - well there was a loud noise. Ah, 
at first I thought maybe it was a gunshot, ah - ah, I 
wasn't - I wasn't sure. But anyway, I - I  quick ran to 
the- to the front of the sotre, ah, and ah, and I  saw, I
saw two men at the - at the counter, and it seemed to me
that - that they were - that they were emptying - emptying 
the till. And ah, there was - there was another man, I 
was pretty sure he was holding a gun. Um, I looked around 
and - and there was Larry, Larry was lying on the floor.
Ah, ah, I don't recall, I think maybe he - he wasn't moving 
Ah, ah- anyway the whole scene, ah - startled me. I um,
I— I guess, and — and when this man that I - I thought 
was holding the gun saw me, he ah- he called to the other 
two fellows to get out of the store. And ah- and then he 
took a shot at me. And it must have — it must have gone 
into the wall behind me.
P: And how long did all this take?
W: Oh, I - I don't know, I - I suppose a - maybe about a
minute.
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How did they get away?
W: Well...let's see. If I'm not mistaken ah- ah, the
two - the two with the money ran off first. Yes, they - 
they,, they ran off first. Ah, this man that was, ah, 
holding the gun, ah, he must - he i \ist have left last.
I noticed - I believe he stumbled as he went through 
the door. I saw him - I saw him get up, and then he 
ran on down the street, ah, with the other two. And, 
ah, a little while later, it was, oh I suppose a matter 
of a few seconds I — I saw — ah, I heard a car squeal out.
P: Did you see this car?
W: No, ah - no, I - I guess - I guess it must have been
around the corner. Ah, yes it was around the corner, out 
of sight.
P: And what did you do then?
W: Well... when I um, ah, when I saw them run down the
street um, I - I hurried back to check on Larry, to see 
if he was um, if he was all right. And ah, um- well,
I- I realized he was dead. I- I must have^ I must have 
called the police next. And then when they came down I,
I called the ambulance, the ambulance came and - and, ah, 
took Larry away. And ah - I guess I gave them a descrip­
tion at that time of what had happened - what I saw.
P i How old would you say they were?
W: Well, they were probably, ah, probably pretty young,
ah...I'd say, oh, nineteen, maybe 24 years old, maybe.
P: And what were they wearing?
W: Well, if I recall right, um... the one, um, the one
with the gun, um, I think he was wearing a long, brown, 
sort of a heavy coat. One of the others had on a jacket, 
um, it must have been a blue ski jacket. And, um, the 
other was - was wearing a green coat. Yes, that...he was
wearing a green coat, I — I think they all had — had
jeans... jeans on.
P; Did you get a good look at their faces?
W: Well, I - I guess so. At least, um, I got a good
look at the face, um, of the man with the gun. Um, the 
other two, they seemed to have their backs to me much — 
much of the time.
P: What were the lighting conditions like, was there
enough light to see them?
W: Well, um, probably, I — I, I think so...we had the...
we had the regular store lights on.
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P: Have you positively identified a suspect as being
the person with the gun who committed armed robbery and first degree murder that night?
W
W
Well, I - I believe so.
Describe this identification for the court.
Well, um, you see when the police called me, ah, 
they said I should come down. That they, ah, they had 
a suspect, that, ah, fitted the description, ah, that 
I had, that I had given them. And so I went down, um... 
they had him in a cell, um, he was all by himself. And 
ah- ah, I looked at the man, ah, for a while and, and 
I was pretty sure he was the man. And so I - I told 
the police that ah- he must be the right man.
P: And was that man the defendant?
W: Yes, sir.
Introduction (read to subjects by experimental assistant 
blind to the experimental hhpotheses) - "At the beginning 
of this portion of videotape of the trial, the defending 
attorney noted that the eyewitness stated earlier that 
all of what he saw happened in about a minute. He then 
asked the eyewitness how much of this time the eywitness 
estimated that he spent looking at the gunman's face."
Defense
Defense Attorney: You stated earlier that all of what
you saw happened in "about a minute". How much of this 
time would you estimate that you spent looking at the 
gunman's face?
Witness: Well, I- I would say, um. I- I would say about
thirty seconds. Um... yes- yes it was about 30 seconds-
D: Are you saying you managed to look at his face for a
half minute while he fired a shot at you?
W: Well, um. . . I guess I was so amazed at what way hap­
pening, um. .. just like I said I - um... I just stopped
dead in my tracks. And ah... I guess he missed me be­
cause, he must have been moving, I think he was moving, 
trying to get out of the store all the time, see?
D: When he raised the gun to take a shot at you did you
try to move out of the way?
W: Well, he raised it so quickly I- I guess I didn't
have time to react, I — I didn't have time to get out of
the way, um I did jump, I must have jumped when he -
when he shot the gun. It — it scared the life out of me. 
Why, I've just never been in anything like that before.
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D: Was he moving all the while you saw him?
W z Yes • • • umtn « « « we 11^ I” I th m k  he wa s ̂ i — I * nt pire tty 
sure and- and I guess that’s when I got a- a pretty good look at his face.
D: Where were you looking during the other thirty
seconds, when you weren't looking at the gunman's face?
W: Well, ah...at Larry...Um, he was in bad shapethere, lying on the floor.
D: Well, are you sure that you didn't spend more thanhalf the time looking at Larry?
W: Ah...let me think, ah... you see, when I- when I
first came out from the back of the store I, I guess 
I was looking mainly at Larry. But then when I realized 
what was happening, I spent most of the rest of the 
time looking at the robbers, you see. And, ah... when 
this- when this one man raised the gun to shoot at me, 
that really drew my attention and, I must have looked 
at him the rest of the time.
D: You say it was the gun that drew your attention?
W: Well, yes, I ah...I- I really couldn't believe what
was happening. I just couldn't believe what was hap­
pening. And when he raised the gun, I was so stunned 
I- well, I could hardly take my eyes off of it.
D: How far away was he standing from you?
W: Hmm...I'd say, ah...oh, just about thirty feet.
D: Are you sure it wasn't 35 feet, let's say, or 4 0 feet?
W: Well, um...Well, I...I don't know, um...I think it
was about thirty feet.
D: When you made the identification at the police station,
how long was that after the crime?
W: About a month.
D : Do you feel that you had a good enough look at the
criminal's face during all the excitement to be able to
identify him a month later?
W: Well, I- I- I think so.
D: When you went down to the police station to make the
identification, did the police say anything to you before 
showing you the suspect?
W: Well, let's see, um. . . the sergeant told me that, theyhad a- a suspect that fitted the description that I gave 
them. And, um, he said that they were pretty sure that 
this was the man they were looking for.
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D: Did he say anything else to you?
W; Well... let m e ... he did say that, ah, this had been
a tough case for them, and that, um, they were going to 
be mighty glad to have it closed and off the books.
D: Was there anything distinctive or unusual about
the defendant's face that helped you identify him?
W: No... I... I just remembered what he looked like.
D: Well, what would you say were the features you
relied upon to identify him?
W: Oh, probably his brown hair, and his average build,
and - and height, and ah, well, just the- just the look
on his face, I guess.
D: Well, how sure are you that the defendant is the
criminal rather than merely resembling the criminal?
W: Well, I...I'm pretty certain.
D: Mr. Wilkins, did you hear the defendant testify
earlier that he shopped in your store two or three
times during the two or three months previous to the
crime?
W: Yes, yes I did, that.
D: Well, is it possible that you identified the
defendant because you remembered seeing him in your 
store before and he just happens to resemble the 
actual criminal?
W: No, I... I probably wouldn't do that, I...Um...I
don't think so, no. I... I probably wouldn't do that.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by experimental 
assistant blind to the experimental hypotheses) - 
"At the beginning of this portion of the videotape 
of the trial, the prosecuting attorney asked the eye­witness to state his name and occupation,"
Prosecution
Witness: My name is Roy Wilkins, W-I-L-K-I-N-S. I'mthe manager of the 7-11 store.
Prosecutor: Describe in your own words what happenedthe night of November 14, 1981,
W: Well, I was in the back of the store working.
Larry, Larry Gelbart, was out front at the register. 
Business was slow that night and I'd gone back to get 
some stock for the shelves, just to keep busy.




It was ah, it was 11:30 at night. 
And what happened then?
Well, I heard someone talking loud out front.
Sounded as if Larry was having an argument with somebody, 
So I decided to go out and see what was going on. Well, 
as soon as I decided to go out, I heard a shot, a gun­
shot. Well, I quick ran to the front of the store, I 
saw two robbers at the counter emptying the till. There 
was a third one standing there holding a gun. Larry 
was over here (gestures) lying on the floor, he wasn't 
moving. Well, I was so scared I - I stopped dead in my 
tracks. And when the one holding the gun saw me, he 
yelled to the other two to get out of the store right 
away. And he raised the gun, took a shot at me, it 
went into the wall.
P: And how long did all this take?
W : Just about a minute.
P : How did they get away?
W: Well, the two with the money, ran out first - the
one with the gun left last, he stumbled just as he went
out the door. He got up and ran out into the street 
with the other two. And a couple of seconds later I 
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W: Well, when I saw thorn run down the street I hurried
back to check on Larry, to see that he - to see if he 
was still alive. He was dead. And so I - i called the 
police, they came down, the ambulance took Larry away.
I gave them a complete description of what I saw.
P: Now how old would you say they are?
W: Well, they were young, 19, 24 years of age.
P: And what were they wearing?
W: Well, the one holding the gun was wearing a long
brown heavy coat. And one of the others had on a blue 
ski jacket. The other, a green coat. All of them were wearing jeans.
P: Did you get a good look at their faces?
W: I got a good look at the face of the one with the
gun. The other two had their backs to me most of the time
P : What were the lighting conditions like - was thereenough light to see?
W: Oh, yes, we had the regular store lights on.
P: Have you positively identified a suspect as being
the person with the gun who committed armed robbery 
and first degree murder that night?
W: Yes, yes.
P : Describe this identification for the court.
W: Well, the police called me, asked me to come down,
they said they had a suspect. So I went down, and they 
had him in a cell, all by himself. And as soon as I 
saw him, I knew he was the man. I told the police they 
had the right man.
P: Was that the defendant?
W: Yes.
P: Thank you, Mr. Wilkins, I have no other questions.
Defense
Introduction — (read to subjects by experimental assistant 
blind to the experimental hypotheses) - "At the beginning 
of this portion of videotape of the trial, the defending 
attorney noted that the eyewitness tated earlier that 
all of what he saw happened in about a minute. He then 
asked the eyewitness how much of this time the eyewitness 
estimated that he spent looking at the gunman* s face.
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Defense Attorney: How much of this time would you
estimate that you spent looking at the gunman's face?
Witness: About thirty seconds.
D: Are you saying the, that you managed to look at his
face for a half minute while he fired a shot at you?
W: I was so amazed at what was going on, just like I
said, I stopped dead in my tracks. And he missed me
because he was moving trying to get out of the storeas soon as he could,
D: When he raised the gun to take a shot at you, did
you try to move out of the way?
W: He raised it so quickly I didn't have time to react,
to get out of the way. I did jump when he shot the gun 
—  I've never been in anything like that before.
D: Was he moving all the while you saw him?
W : Yes - he paused when he took the shot at me, and
that's when I got a good look at his face.
D: Where were you looking during the other thirty
seconds when you weren't looking at the gunman's face?
W: At Larry. He was in bad shape lying there on the floor.
D: Are you sure you didn't spend more than half the time
looking at Larry?
W: Oh, no. When I first came out from the back of the
store, I looked mainly at Larry. But when I realised 
what had happened, I was looking mainly at the robbers.
Like when the one raised the gun to take a shot at me, 
that really drew my attention. I spent at least half 
time — half of the rest of the time looking at him.
D: You say the gun drew your attention?
W: Well, of course, I couldn't believe what was happening.
And when he raised the gun, I was so stunned I could 
hardly take my eyes off it.
D : How far away were you standing from him?
W: Just about thirty feet.
D : Are you sure it wasn't 35 feet, let's say, or 4 0 feet?
W: No, it was thirty feet.
D: When you made the identification at the police station,
how long was that after the crime?
W: About a month.
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D: Do you feel that you had a good enough look at
the criminal’s face during all that excitement to beable to identify him a month later?
W: Oh, yes. Yes.
D: Let me ask you this. When you went down to the
police station to make the identification, did the 
police say anything to you before showing you the suspect?
W: Oh, the sergeant said that they had a suspect that
fitted the description that I had given them. He said 
he was pretty sure that, ah, he was the right man.
D : Did he say anything else to you?
W: He mentioned what a tough case this had been for
them and how glad they were going to be to have it 
closed and off the books,
D: Was there anything distinctive or unusual about the
defendant's face that helped you identify him?
W: No, I just remembered what he looked like.
D: What would you say were the features you relied upon 
to identify him?
W: Oh, his brown hair, his average build and height,
and that look on his face.
D: Well, how sure are you that the defendant is the
criminal rather than merely resembling the criminal?
W: Oh, I'm certain.
D: Mr. Wilkins, did you hear the defendant testify that
he shopped in your store two or three times during the 
two or three months prior to the crime?
W: Oh, yes. Yes.
D: Well, is it possible that you identified the defendant
because you remembered seeing him in your-store before and
he just happens to resemble the actual criminal?
W: No- no, no. I'm sure he's the man. I could never
forget that look on his face.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by experimental 
assistant blind to the experimental hypotheses) - 
"At the beginning of this portion of the videotape 
of the trial, ^ e  defending attorney asked Dr. Walters 
how accurate, in general, the average eyewitness is."
Relevant Factors Expert Testimony
Defense Attorney: ...how accurate would you say theaverage eyeiwtness is?
Dr. Walters: Research using staged crimes has shown
that, depending on the conditions, anywhere from 15% 
to 85% of eyewitnesses may choose a wrong person from 
a lineup or group of pictures. That is, depending upon 
the conditions, 15% to 85% of eyewitnesses choose a 
person from the lineup that they believe is the criminal 
but who, in reality, is not the criminal but rather is an innocent suspect,
D: Could you elaborate for us how these researchers
stage crimes for the eyewitnesses to observe?
W: Many have the subjects view films of crimes, other
studies use crimes staged by the experimenter. After 
the subjects see the crime, they are asked at a later 
time to identify the criminal from a lineup of people 
or from a group of pictures.
D: So then the eyewitnesses in this research do some­
times see an actual event?
W: Yes. In some of the experiments that have been done,
the subjects do see actual live events. Often a theft 
or assault is ateged for the subjects, so it* s relatively 
ccHTimon to use a live event, but not as common as films 
because the psychologists want to have some control of 
the materials so you know every time you are presenting 
it to a new group of people you are presenting exactly 
the same thing, whereas a live event might change a 
little bit each time its presented.
D: Could you give us an example of one of these staged
crimes?
W: A situation that's used fairly often is to have some­
one attack or assault a professor while he's lecturing 
in front of a college classroom. The criminal is actually 
staging the attack and the professor knows the attack is 
going to happen, but to the audience it looks like a real 
assault is taking place. The people in the class are 
then asked to pick the attacker out of a lineup of people
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or out of a set of pictures. In this type of experiment, 
the people in the audience, the eyewitnesses to this 
crime, are often unreliable and inaccurate in their identifications.
D: What are some of the factors that affect eyewitness'
memory and ability to make an accurate identification?
W: There are several physical factors that affect eye­
witness reliability. The lighting conditions, the distance of the eyewitness from the criminal, are factors. There 
should be adequate light - the eyewitness should be 
close enough to make an identification. Also, whether 
the criminal was moving or not may be important - fast 
movement may lower the likelihood of an accurate identi­fication .
D: What about time and its effects on memory?
W: Generally, the shorter the time span the eyewitness
has seen the criminal, the more likely it is that the 
identification may be in error. The length of time from 
seeing the crime to identifying the criminal is also 
important - research has generally shown that parts of 
memory are lost over time.
D: What are some of the other factors that affect an
eyewitness* ability to make an accurate identification?
W: One of the major factors is stress. Research indi­
cates that people under stress are more likely to make 
certain types of errors.
D: What are some of these errors?
W: Stress often causes people to overestimate the amount
of time the event or crime took. That is, what may only 
have taken 10 to 15 seconds may seem like it took much 
longer, say a minute, or even five minutes. So the 
amount of time that an eyewitness views the criminal's face may be an overestimation if the person is under a 
lot of stress. There are factors related to stress such 
as violence and the presence of a weapon that also reduce 
eyewitness* ability to make a correct identification.
D: How does the presence of violence influence eyewit­
nesses?
W: Research supports the idea that people viewing a
violent, emotional event or crime are less likely to be 
able to accurately report what they saw than people who 
see a nonviolent event. Researchers explain this effect 
as being due to the emotionality or stress associated with 
the violent event. You see, there is research which sup­
ports stress having a number of general effects upon the 
way a person sees an event or crime. I mentioned before
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the tendency for people under stress to overestimate the 
amount of time the crime took. Stress can also have a 
restricting effect on attention - people just don't pay 
as much attention to what's going on - particularly if 
there is a weapon, such as a gun or knife, present at the scene of the crime.
D: How does the presence of a gun affect the way aperson perceives or sees a crime.
W: Dr. Loftus, one of the leading researchers and
authorities in the field of eyewitness testimony, talks 
about a factor called "weapon focus." What happens when 
a weapon is present is it tends to capture some of the 
witness' processing time and capacity, leaving less time 
available for other details and for other aspects of the 
incident. Weapon focus may have the effect of reducing 
ability to describe and remember other aspects of the 
situation^ such as remembering the person who was holding
the weapon. However, people often have a very good
ability to describe the weapon. That's what is meant by weapon focus.
D: What about the number of criminals committing a
crime, would that affect the ability of an eyewitness 
to accurately perceive a crime?
W: Yes. Research has found that the more criminals
present, the less accurate eyewitnesses report of the
crime is. Again, during a brief period of time, having
more than one criminal present requires more processing 
time. There's only so many details a person can process 
in a short period of time.
D: Are there any kinds or types of faces that are
more likely to be remembered by an eyewitness?
W: Yes, people usually remember really unusual or
distinctive faces easier; research has shown, that they 
do this better than remembering faces with no distinctive 
features. For instance, someone with an unusual nose, 
or someone with a noticeable scar on his face is more 
likely to be remembered by the eyewitness than someone 
who has no unusual features or an "average" looking face 
that's similar to a lot of other persons,
Dî Is it possible that an eyewitness might misidentify 
someone as the criminal because his face looks familiar 
because of a contact sometime before the crime?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 125
W: Yes, the term for this is "unconscious transference".
This happens when an eyewitness confuses a person seen 
in one situation with a person that was seen in a 
different situation or in a different context. People 
will look at faces that they have seen at a different 
time - in different contexts - and mistakenly relate 
those faces back to an incorrect situation.
Introduction — (read to subjects by experimental assistant 
blind to the experimental hypotheses) - "At the beginning 
of this portion of videotape of the trial, the prosecuting 
attorney asked Dr, Walters to give an example of uncon­scious transference."
Prosecution
Prosecutor: Could you give an example of unconscioustransference?
Dr. Walters: Patrick Wall has given a classic example
of a train clerk who was robbed at gunpoint. The train 
clerk subsequently went to a lineup and picked a sailor 
out of the lineup. The sailor did not commit the robbery, 
had a very good alibi, but had purchased tickets from 
this train clerk on three prior occasions. What is 
happening in this situation is the train clerk, the 
witness, goes to the lineup. In fact, there is face 
in the lineup that looks familiar and that familiarity 
is mistakenly related back to the crime, rather than 
back to the purchasing of the tickets. That's a classic 
example of unconscious transference.
P: Are there factors which can affect an eyewitness'
identification of a suspect, let's say, when he's asked 
to do so by the police?
W: It's very important that the eyewitness have the
opportunity to pick the suspect out of a "fair" lineup.
The chances of misidentification are reduced if the 
eyewitness chooses a person out of a group of persons 
who bear a reasonable resemblance to each other, who 
look at least somewhat alike. For instance, people in 
the lineup are of the same race, same sex, no gross 
height or weight differences. If that is done, the 
chance of misidentification is reduced. It is generally 
agreed that the worst method to use and the method with 
the greatest likelihood of a. wrong person being identi­
fied as the criminal is what's called a "showup". In 
a showup, the police simply show the eyewitness a suspect 
by himself and ask the eyewitness if that' s the person 
who committed the crime.
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P: What are some of the factos that make showing only
one person to the eyewitness a poor procedure?
W: The eyewitness often believes that the police have
a good reason for showing them the suspect, that they 
have some incriminating evidence against the suspect, 
something like this. There are often subtle but power­
ful psychological pressures on the eyewitness to identify the suspect as the criminal. This effect will be 
especially increased if the police put pressure on the 
eyewitness to identify the suspect, for example, they 
might tell the eyewitness that they think they have the 
right man, or by indicating that they'll be pleased if 
the eyewitness can identify the suspect. People are 
often especially likely to be influenced by someone in 
authority, such as the police. Showing only one suspect 
to the eyewitness is likely to increase psychological 
factors influencing the witness to identify the suspect as the criminal.
P: Would the eyewitness' confidence in the identifi­
cation by any indication of how accurate the identification is?
W: There is considerable research evidence showing that
the confidence of an eyewitness may have little or no 
relationship to the accuracy of the eyewitness. The 
confidence of the eyewitness in his identification is 
not a good indicator of how accurate his identification 
is likely to be.
P: What if the eyewitness is so confident that he
identified the right person as the criminal that he 
says, "I'd never forget that face. I'm sure that's the 
man" after making an identification. Would a statement 
like that increase the likelihood that the witness made 
an accurate identification?
W: Again, the relationship of confidence to accuracy
has generally been found to be weak to nonexistent. It 
would not be uncommon for a highly confident witness to 
be wrong, to be entirely in error, even if he made a 
statement like that.
P: Dr. Walters, could you summarize for the court how
a person might best judge the accuracy of an eyewitness 
identification?
W: As I mentioned earlier, depending on the conditions,
anywhere from 15% to 85% of eyeiwtnesses may choose a 
wrong person from a lineup. It is important that they 
pay attention to conditions or circumstances which may 
distort or influence the eyewitness' testimony. Spec if— 
ically, one should pay attention to the conditions under
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which the crime occurred. Such factors as lighting 
and how far the witness was from the criminal are 
important. One should note whether the situation 
was a dynamic and changing one - whether there was 
a lot of rapid, quick movement. Eyewitnesses often 
do worse under these conditions. Stress is a major 
factor - if the eyewitness was threatened, if there 
was violence involved - if a weapon was present, there 
is a greater likelihood of misidentification. It is 
important to consider that stress may lead to the eye­
witness overestimating the maount of time the crime took, 
which may involve an overestimation of the amount of 
time the eyewitness had to view the criminal's face.
The number of criminals is important, as the number of 
criminals may reduce accuracy since it may cut down on 
the amount of time the eyewitness has available to 
process other variables. Time has important effects 
upon memory — the time the eyewitness actually had to 
view the criminal, the time between the crime and the 
identification by the eyewitness may have major bearing 
on whether an accurate identification has been made.
The circumstances of the identification should be 
considered. One should consider whether a "fair" lineup 
was conducted, remembering that a "showup" or one-person 
lineup is the poorest condition under which the identi­
fication can take place. One should also pay attention 
to possible indications that the eyewitness was put 
under pressure from the police or from authorities to 
identify the suspect as the criminal. Generally, 
witnesses are more likely to correctly identify unusual 
or distinctive faces. One should also be aware that if 
the eyewitness has seen the suspect previously in some 
other context, that the eyewitness may have identified 
the person not because he was identified with the crime, 
but because the suspect's face is familiar - mistakenly 
related back to the crime. A person attempting to 
judge whether an eyewitness has identified the criminal 
or an innocent suspect should avoid placing any faith 
in the eyewitness* confidence. In short, in order to 
tell if an eyewitness is accurate, one should place 
little stock in how confident the eyewitness is about 
the identification and should instead focus on situa­
tional factors, including those I have mentioned, that 
may have facilitated or inhibited the accuracy of the 
eyewitness.
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Introduction - (read to subjects by experimental 
assistant blind to the experimental hypotheses) - 
"At the beginning of this portion of the videotape 
of the trial, the prosecuting attorney asked Dr. Watkins 
how accurate and reliable the average eyewitness is."
Opposing Psychologist Expert Testimonv
Prosecuting Attorney: Are eyewitnesses really as
inaccurate and unreliable as Dr. Walters would have us believe?
Dr. Watkins: It depends upon the viewing conditions,
of course. But there is no reason to doubt eyewitnesses 
who had a good view of the criminal. Generally, most 
laboratory face recognition studies have found that 70% 
or more of persons viewing faces under good conditions will make an accurate identification.
P: What about eyewitness confidence - is eyewitness
confidence related to how accurate the eyewitness is?
W : Again, it depends on the conditions, but research
has found significant and positive correlations between 
eyeiwntess confidence and accuracy when the viewing 
conditions were good. In the studies I mentioned 
before, in which subjects saw the faces under good 
viewing conditions, it was generally found that eye­
witness confidence was significantly and positively 
related to how accurate the eyewitness is,
P: Dr. Walters discussed some of the methods this
research uses. Are there any problems with the method- 
ology of this research area?
W: Yes. Basically the problem is one of generalization. 
In simple language, it is difficult to know how much this 
research, if any, actually applies to the real world 
situation. You see, many of the conditions that subjects 
experience in an experimental situation may be signifi­
cantly different from the conditions faced by the victim 
or observer of an actual crime.
P: How is the situation different for subjects than for
people who have experienced or have seen a real crime?
W: Well, for instance, much of the research studies had
subjects watch a videotape or film of a crime simulated 
by actors. Watching something that has been recorded is 
not the same as being there, and it is debatable in any 
given case as to how closely the actors are able to sim­
ulate a crime. Even the so-called "staged" crimes 
deviate significantly from the average eyewitness' real 
world experience.
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P: How are staged crimes different from what an eye­witness in the real world observes?
W: To give an example, some of the experimental para­
digms or situations use the theft of a calculator as 
the crime. This is not the sort of real world crime 
that would usually involve and lead up to having an 
eyewitness identify a criminal from a police lineup.
The crime simply is not as serious as a major robbery
it's a far cry from a heinous crime such as murder. 
Other experiments have often used the situation where 
a professor is attacked while lecturing in a college 
classroom. The assault, for obvious reasons, is not 
injurious to the professor and happens in front of a 
classroom of college students who later make an identi­fication,
P; Is the identification procedure used in these studies 
different from what happens in a police station?
W: Yes, the identification procedure employed in many
of these studies is much different from what actually 
happens in a police lineup. Many times, an actual lineup 
isn't even held - the subjects don't identify the fake 
assailant from a lineup, but rather they may be asked to 
pick the assailant from an array of pictures.
P: But doesn't having them pick the criminal from a
group of pictures tell them that the attack on the 
professor wasn't real?
W: Yes, in fact because of this, in many of these exper­
iments, the experimenters tell the subjects before they 
make an identification that the attack was staged and 
that they are in fact participating in an experiment.
P: Did you say that some of these studies use college
students as subjects?
W; By far the large majority of such studies, as much 
as 80 - 90% of them, use college students exclusively,
P: Are there potential problems in basing a lot of this
research on the perceptions of university students?
W: The main problem is the one I referred to earlier -
one of generalization. How much these studies apply to 
people of different ages, occupations, and educational 
levels is unknown. There may be significant differences 
in how, for example, a 19 year old freshman responds to 
these experiments than how a 60 year old businessman 
would. To make matters worse, we do not know what dif­
ferences, if any, exist. But it is a point of concern 
that the large majority of these studies are based upon
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such a narrow population, students in their early 20*s for the most part.
Pî Watkins, based upon this research, can we predict
how reliable a certain individual in a certain eyewitness situation will be?
W: No.
P : Why not?
All of this research is based on statistical methods 
which focus on how groups of people respond within a 
P^^tioular experiment. The focus is on the average 
response of the group, not the individual. Within any 
P^^bicular group, there may be persons who responded very 
<^ifforently or even directly opposite to the way the group 
as a whole responded. These experiments tell us how a 
groups of individuals generally responded, but don't allow 
us to make predictions about a certain individual. All we 
can say, if you believe the research, is what might be 
likely to happen among people in general or on the average 
if a certain factor is operating. The problem is that 
different individuals respond differently to different 
situations and different viewing conditions.
P: Is it possible that there may be factors that facil­
itate or inhibit eyewitness reliability that have not 
been investigated?
W: It's not only possible, it's highly likely. Much of
the research Dr. Walters talked about has been done in 
the last twenty years, so it's a relatively new research 
area. It is likely that there are many additional 
factors that affect eyewitness performance of which we 
are unaware. Of the factors affecting eyewitness accuracy 
that we do know exist, additional research is needed con­
cerning under what specific kinds of conditions and with 
what types of individuals they operate. For example, take 
the phenomenon of unconscious transference - we know that 
it can occur, but we are not able to specify in a par­
ticular case whether it has or has not occurred. All we 
know at this point is that it exists.
P: Is it possible that some eyewitnesses who view a crime
under poor conditions, that is under conditions where they 
have a number of factors operating against them making an 
accurate identification, could nevertheless make an ac­
curate identification despite those factors?
W: Yes, it is entirely possible.
P: Could you explain how this can happen?
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W: It goes back to what I said about the statistical
design of these studies. They reflect how the average 
individual responds to a factor that inhibits accuracy. 
Many people may not react at all the way the statistical 
average estimates that they will. The fact is that 
there are individual differences in person' perceptual 
and memory abilities. We know that people differ in 
intellectual abilities, and in their abilities to make 
judgments concerning time, distance, facial recognition, 
etc. There are many people who because of certain char­
acteristics or abilities may not react at all the way these studies predict.
P: What about people's reactions to stress? Does stressalways have a negative effect on performance?
W : No. The manner in which stress affects people is
embodied in a psychological principle called the Yerkes- 
Dodson Law. This law states that the relationship between 
stress and performance is curvilinear. That is, up to a 
certain optimal point, increasing stress actually aids 
performance. It is only after the stress is increased 
above this ideal point for the individual that it begins 
to have negative effects.
P: Is there any way of knowing whether the stress in a
real life crime situation was beyond the eyewitness's 
optimal point?
W: No - and that is a problem because it is usually
simply assumed that the stress was great enough upon 
the eyewitness that it had negative effects. Once again, 
people differ in their abilities to handle stress and 
the level of stress in one stress situation that causes 
poor performance in one person may actually facilitate 
the performance of another person in the same situation 
who has a higher stress threshold.
p : Suppose stress did have a negative effect on a given
eyewitness to a crime - are there other factors which 
could reduce or counteract the negative impact of the 
stress on the eyewitness?
W: One of the difficulties of this research is that
we have some general ideas about how a single factor, 
in isolation, such as stress, affects the average person. 
However, we know very little about how a number of factors 
acting simulataneously affect one another and the eye­
witness. It is possible and even likely that the effect 
of a given factor that effects eyewitness accuracy in 
isolation is different when combined with a number of 
other viewing factors. It is difficult to know how the 
factors interact with one another since this research
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usually studies only one or at most two factors at 
one time. The real world crime situation is usually 
a good deal more complex than that. To answer your 
question, it is reasonable to believe that there are 
factors, such as the significance of the event and the 
eyewitness' motivation to commit the criminal's face to 
memory, which may mitigate some of the negative effects 
of stress. As I said earlier, additional research is 
needed, especially since there may be additional factors 
which affect eyewitness performance of which we are unaware.
Pî Dr. Walters talked about "weapon focus" as a factor 
which decreases eyewitness accuracy, the idea being that 
the eyewitness focuses on the weapon in a violent crime, 
rather than spending the time observing the criminal's 
face. Is this a real phenomenon and could you talk 
about the research it's based upon?
W: The studies which support the existence of weapon
focus fall largely into two categories: (1) perceptual
research in the area of experimental psychology, and
(2) naturalistic field studies and observations. Many 
of the experimental studies are thought to generalize 
or apply to an eyewitness situation even though most of 
the studies are laboratory research which are not direct­
ly concerned with, and are often far removed from, an 
actual eyewitness situation. The naturalistic and field 
studies, the second group I mentioned, represent un­
controlled studies from which it isn't possible to 
determine if the conclusions are accurate. There is 
one eyewitness study which supports the phenomenon of 
weapon focus, but its methodology was flawed. It in­
volved having subjects identify someone who they pre­
viously saw either with a weapon or without a weapon.
The methodology was flawed because the two experimental 
conditions differed in more ways than whether the weapon 
was present or absent. The assailant in the weapon con­
dition also had blood on his hands, was more hostile, 
and made different types of statements than the assailant 
in the no weapon condition. In this one study directly 
related to weapon focus, one cannot separate out whether 
subjects' decreased accuracy in identification in the 
weapon condition was due to the presence of the weapon 
or to the other differences. In short, while we have 
some support for such a phenomenon, there is no direct 
proof for the existence of weapon focus.
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^ W a t k i n s  y has there been any research on how expert 
psychological testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness 
identification^ such as that given by Dr. Walters, effects jurors?
W: Yes, there have been four studies on the effects of
expert psychological testimony upon juror's decisions.
P: And what have these studies found?
W: They have found that having a psychologist testify
the various factors affecting eyewitness accuracy, 
like Dr. Walters did, reduces jurors' belief in the accuracy of the eyewitness.
P: You mean that these studies found that jurors who
have heard an expert psychologist testify in the manner 
Dr. Walters did were more likely to not believe the 
eyewitness and to conclude that the alleged criminal was innocent?
W: That is correct. Expert testimony invariably
reduced belief in eyewitness accuracy.
P: Dr. Watkins, could you summarize for the court the
difficulties with the current eyewitness research?
W: Yes. While the accuracy of eyewitness depends upon
the viewing conditions, under good conditions, there is 
no reason to doubt eyewitnesses, as 7 0% or more of persons 
are able to make a correct identification under good 
conditions. It has been found that eyewitness confidence 
is significantly and positively related to eyewitness 
accuracy under such conditions. The applicability and 
generalizability of the results of many studies used to 
support conclusions in this area are often questionable 
because of the use of largely college age samples, the 
use of films, photographs and videotapes, different 
identification procedures, and the use of staged or 
simulated crimes by actors which make the experimental 
situation considerably different from that of an actual 
crime situation. Further, some of the studies are 
methodologically flawed and experimental laboratory 
research used to support conclusions are often far 
removed from the real world eyewitness situation. There 
is much that we simply do not know in this area - ad­
ditional work is needed on additional factors that may 
facilitate or inhibit eyewitness performance. The real 
world situation is usually much more complex than these 
experiments - more work is needed on how various combin­
ations of facts affect one another and the eyewitness. 
There is good reason to be skeptical as there is much 
that isn't known and considerable difficulties exist in
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generalizing from these studies to "real" eyewitnesses. 
There are four separate studies which indicate that 
persons exposed to expert psychological testimony sim­
ilar to Dr. Walters' testimony tend to doubt the eye­
witness more and believe the defendant is not guilty. 
The current state of affairs is that we cannot predict 
how reliable a single individual in a given situation 
is. More work needs to be done on how the unique 
characteristics of an individual affects his ability 
as an eyewitness, as we know different persons respond 
differently to different situations. It is possible 
that a person will respond completely different from 
the way the current research predicts he or she will 
respond.
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Please provide your age/ sex, year in college, and 
college major on the lines below. All information 
will be kept strictly confidential.
Age:
Sex: M F (circle one)
Year on College: 1 2  3 4 graduate student
(circle one)
College Major: _______________________________
Have you ever served on a jury before? Yes No
(circle one)
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Do you believe the eyewitness identified the gunman 
or an innocent person? Circle one of the choices below:
Gunman Innocent Person
How confident are you about your decision in the 
above question? Indicate your answer by circling 
a number on the scale provided below:
1 ------------2 ------------- 3 ------------- 4 ----------------- 5 -------- 6 ------------7 -------------8 --------------9 - -
not at all confident
—  -------------1 0
absolutelyconfident
Based on the testimony and evidence presented, rate 
the probability of the defendant's guilt by circling 
one of the numbers on the scale below:
•8 - •10
Definitely Not Guilty DefinitelyGuilty
How confident was the eyewitness in the videotape 
in his ability to identify the gunman? Indicate your 
answer by circling a number on the scale provided below:
■4- ■8- ■10
Not at all Confident
DefinitelyConfident
Estimate the percentage of people who would make a 
correct identification under the circumstances described 
by the eywitness by circling one of the percentages 
provided below:
0 %  1 0 %  2 0 %  3 0 %  4 0 %  5 0 %  6 0 %  7 0 %  8 0 %  9 0 %  1 0 0 %
To what extent do you believe that you can generally tell
from an eyewitness’ confidence in his testimony whether or 
not the eyewitness made an accurate identification? Indi­
cate your answer by circling a number on the scale provided 
below:
1_________9_______ 1-4 ------------5 --------------- 6 -----------7 -----------8 ---------------- 9 --------1 0
Can almost never tell if eyewitness is accurate
Can almost always tell if eyewitness is accurate
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What percentage of eyewitness testimony, in general, 
do your believe is accurate? Circle one of the 
percentages below:
0 %  1 0 %  2 0 %  3 0 %  4 0 %  5 0 %  6 0 %  7 0 %  8 0 %  9 0 %  1 0 0 %
In deciding upon whether you thought the eyewitness 
identified the gunman or an innocent person, how much 
did you base your decision upon the eyewitness' 
description of the crime? Circle one of the numbers 
on the scale below:
1 -------------2 --------------3 ------------4 ------------- 5 -------------6 -------------- 7 --------- 8 -------------9 -------------1 0
Did not base Based decision largelydecision on eyewitness' upon eyewitness'description of crime description of theat all crime
In deciding upon whether you thought the eyewitness 
identified the gunman or an innocent person, how much 
did you base your decision upon the eyewitness' confidence 
in his testimony? Circle one of the numbers on the scale 
below:
1---- 2-----3---- 4-----5---- 6----- 7--- 8---- 9---- 10
Did not base decision Based decision largelyon the eyewitness' upon the eyewitness'confidence at all confidence
Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement on the scale provided below: The film presented
a realistic example of an eyewitness testimony.
1--------2---------3------- 4-------- 5--------6---------7------8- ------9--------10
Strongly StronglyDisagree Agree
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(control conditions)
Please describe in your own words in the space below 
how you decided that the eyewitness had identified 
the gunman or an innocent person:
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How much did the psychologist^ s expert testimony 
affect your decision concerning whether you thought 
the eyewitness identified the gunman or an innocent 
person? Circle one of the numbers below:
1---- 2-------3-4------5----- 6----7---- 8----- 9----10
Did not base Based decision
decision on the largely upon the
psychologist's psychologist's
expert testimony expert testimonyat all
Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statanent on the scale provided below: The film
presented a realistic and believable example of a 
psychologist givrnq testimony on research in the 
area of eyewitness testimony.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
Have you ever seen the expert depicted in the video­
tape before? If so, in what capacity?
Please describe in your own words in the space below 
how you decided that the eyewitness had identified 
the gunman or an innocent person:
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How much did the first expert psychologist's (Dr. Walters) 
testimony affect your decision concerning whether you 
thought the eyewitness identified the gunman or an 
innocent person? Circle one of the numbers below:
1 --------------2 -----------3 -------------- 4 ------------ 5 -----------6 ---------------7 --------------8 ------------9 -------------1 0
Did not base decision Based decision largelyon the first psychologist's upon the first psych-expert testimony at all ologist's experttestimony
Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement on the scale provided below: The film
presented a realistic and believable example of a 
psychologist (Dr. Walters) giving testimonv on research 
in the area of eyewitness testimony.
1-----2----3----- 4---- 5----6----- 7-----8---- 9---- 10
Strongly StronglyDisagree Agree
How much did the opposing (second) psychologist's 
(Dr. Watkins) testimony affect your decision concerning 
whether you thought the eyewitness identified the 
gunman or an innocent person? Circle one of the 
numbers below:
1 ------------- 2 -----------3 -------------- 4 ------------ 5 -----------6 ---------------7 ------------- 8 ----------- 9 - - — 1 0
Did not base decision Based decision largelyon the second psycholo— upon the second psych-gist's expert testimony ologist's expertat all testimony
Have you ever seen the first expert (Dr. Walters)
(jgptcted in the videotape before? If so, in what capacity?
you ever seen the second expert (Dr. Watkins)
(30pj_cted in the videotape before? If so, in what capacity?
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
page 143
(expert plus opposing expert conditions)
Rate your agreement or disagreement with the following 
statement on the scale provided below: The film
presented a realistic and believable example of a 
psychologist (Dr. Watkins) giving testimony on 
research in the area of eyeiwtness testimony.
Strongly Strongly
Disagree Agree
Please describe in your own words in the space below 
how you decided that the eyewitness had identified 
the gunman or an innocent person:
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APPENDIX 6 
INTRODUCTION TO EYEWITNESS VIDEOTAPES
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The purpose of the present investigation is to 
determine the nature of decision making among jurors. 
Please read the following description of a crime, after 
which you will be viewing portions of a trial via video­
tape. You will then be asked to render a verdict as 
well as answer several other questions on the basis of 
the evidence presented. Obviously, this is only a 
summary to the actual court proceedings. However, 
please imagine yourself to be in a courtroom situation 
and assume that you are an actual member of the jury.
If you feel that you cannot do this, please indicate 
this immediately.
You will shortly be viewing portions of a trial via 
videotape concerning the robbery and murder which took 
place in a large town in Montana on November 14, 1981. 
Previous to the portions of the trial you are viewing, 
the defendant had testified and stated the following 
point:
(1) that he did not commit the crime;
(2) that he had been in town for only three months and
had not had the opportunity to develop close friends 
or ties in the town;
(3) that he was at home in his apartment sleeping the
night of the crime; and
(4) that he had shopped at the 7-11 convenience store in question two or three times in the three months 
since moving to the town three months ago.
Please pay close attention to the videotape.
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APPENDIX 7
INTRODUCTION TO EXPERT TESTIMONY BY 
A PSYCHOLOGIST VIDEOTAPE
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Dr, Al Walters is a Ph.D. Clinical Psychologist 
who has been asked by the defense to testify as an 
expert on eyewitness testimony and memory. Dr. Walters 
has 18 years of forensic and courtroom experience, and 
has testified in numerous criminal cases. He is also 
a Clinical Psychology professor who teaches graduate 
forensic psychology courses. Additionally, he actively 
conducts, studies, and publishes research in the area 
of eyewitness testimony and memory.
Please pay close attention to the videotape.
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APPENDIX 8
INTRODUCTION TO OPPOSING EXPERT TESTIMONY 
BY A PSYCHOLOGIST VIDEOTAPE
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Dr. Watkins is a Ph.D-^ Clinical Psychologist who 
was asked by the prosecution to testify concerning 
eyewitness research. Dr. Watkins has many years of 
forensic experience, and has served as a forensic 
consultant to the courts in a multitude of cases. In 
his role as Clinical Psychology professor, he teaches 
seminars and workshops related to forensic methods.
He also regularly authors research which is published 
in legal and psychological journals. Dr. Watkins 
prepared his testimony in advance in response to 
Dr. Walters' testimony, and referred to his notes 
during the courtroom session.
Please pay close attention to the videotape
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